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ABSTRACT 
We examine the commodity futures pricing role of active attention to weather, disease, 
geopolitical or economic threats or “hazard fear” as proxied by the volume of internet searches 
by 149 query terms. A long-short portfolio strategy that sorts the cross-section of commodity 
futures contracts according to a hazard fear signal captures a significant premium. This 
commodity hazard fear premium reflects compensation for extant fundamental, tail, volatility 
and liquidity risks factors, but it is not subsumed by them. Exposure to hazard-fear is strongly 
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“Data are widely available, what is scarce is the ability to extract wisdom from them” (Hal 
Varian, Google Chief Economist, emeritus Professor at University of California, Berkeley.) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE COMMODITY FUTURES PRICING literature largely rests on two pillars known as the theory 
of storage (Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1949; Brennan, 1958) and the hedging pressure hypothesis 
(Cootner, 1960; Hirshleifer, 1988). The former pillar argues that the dynamics of commodity 
futures prices is primarily driven by inventory levels proxied by the slope of the futures curve, 
while the latter pillar contends that the primary determinant of commodity futures prices are 
hedgers’ net positions. In support of these theories, a number of studies suggest that a premium 
can be extracted by taking long positions in backwardated futures markets and short positions 
in contangoed futures markets.1 More recently, the literature has considered alternative 
commodity characteristics such as liquidity (Szymanowska et al., 2014), skewness (Fernandez-
Perez et al., 2018), basis-momentum (Boons and Prado, 2019) or convexity (Gu et al., 2019) 
and has shown that they also have predictive power over commodity futures returns. 
Our article hypothesizes that “fear” of rare and extreme events influences the pricing of 
commodity futures contracts over and beyond the factors that have been shown to price 
commodities. In this paper, the terminology commodity hazard fear is broadly defined as the 
economic agents’ apprehension or concerns about potential weather, agricultural disease, 
geopolitical and economic events that may shift the commodity supply or demand curves. Fear 
can be considered as one of a set of basic or innate human emotions that is not necessarily 
linked to irrationality. Since fear is modulated by the process of cognition and learning, it can 
                                                                 
1
 Rising commodity futures prices are predicted by the backwardation state as signalled by 
scarce inventories (Gorton et al., 2012), a downward-sloping term structure of futures prices 
(Erb and Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Szymanowska et al., 2014; Bakshi et 
al., 2019), net short hedging, net long speculation (Bessembinder, 1992; Basu and Miffre, 2013; 
Kang et al., 2019) or superior strong past performance (Erb and Harvey, 2006; Miffre and 
Rallis, 2007; Bakshi et al., 2019). Conversely, falling commodity futures prices are predicted 
by the contango state as signalled by the same characteristics at the other end of the spectrum.  
3 
 
thus be deemed as rational or appropriate – the fear of losing money can rationally cause agents 
to manage their risks actively (Lo, 2011).2 For instance, if a storm is approaching, for as long 
as there is some uncertainty regarding its impact on the supply of a commodity, fear of the 
storm can be considered as a rational response of commodity traders to the threat. Likewise, 
the recollection of extreme weather that destroyed the coffee harvest in the past may trigger 
fear in the run-up to the current harvest season since early experiences also shape the fear 
system (Tottenham, 2014). While being agnostic on whether the hazard fear is purely rational 
or contains elements of irrationality (i.e., “excessive” fear), we hypothesize that hazard fear 
can affect commodity futures prices above and beyond fundamentals.  
Let us first consider hazards that are supply-reducing (e.g., a frost that is likely to shift 
inwards the coffee supply curve) or demand-increasing (e.g., a heatwave that is likely to shift 
outwards the natural gas demand curve). Fear of these hazards induces expectations of a sharp 
rise in spot prices. We hypothesize that these expectations, in turn, influence the hedging 
decisions of commodity market participants; namely, producers reduce their short hedges and 
consumers increase their long hedges compared to the hedging strategy that they adopt in the 
absence of hazard-fear. The resulting increase in net long hedging ought to be matched by an 
increase in net short speculation, but the later may be deterred by the fact that short futures 
positions are seen as especially risky for speculators in a commodity market bedevilled by 
supply-reducing or demand-increasing hazard fears.3 Thus, to entice short speculation the 
                                                                 
2
 There is a large literature in psychology on whether fear is rational or irrational. A widely-
held view is that an irrational fear is an emotion associated with an event or situation that an 
individual seeks to avoid, even though it is extremely unlikely and/or inconsequential.  
3
 J.P. Morgan’s Global Commodities Research (22 Sept 2017) commentary: “Non-commercial 
investors have been reducing their net short position across the agri commodity complex over 
the last fortnight amid these weather-related production risks […] We anticipate that non-
commercial’s will continue the wave of short covering through September, now that La Niña 
is a material threat, and oil prices are on the rise. This is particularly the case across markets 
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current price of the futures contract (relative to the expected future spot price) ought to be set 
higher than it would be if only fundamental forces were at play. Formally, the expected fear 
premium is the upward bias in the futures price as predictor of the future spot price (or 
mispricing) relative to what the futures price would be in the absence of any hazard fear. More 
explicitly, the overall commodity futures premium induced by the hazard fear can be simply 
formalized as 	, ≡ , −  > 0 with , = , +
	,, where , denotes the fundamental price at t of a futures contract with 
maturity  in the absence of fear and 	, > 0 denotes the hazard-fear induced 
upward shift in the current futures price required to attract net short speculation. Thus, the 
anticipated decrease in the futures price as maturity approaches is the overall premium captured 
by short speculators which incorporates both a fundamental and a hazard-fear component.  
Let us next consider a hazard that is either supply-increasing (e.g., a lift of an oil embargo 
that is likely to shift outward the oil supply curve) or demand-reducing (e.g., an economic 
recession that shrinks the demand for commodities). Fear of these hazards causes expectations 
of spot prices sharply decreasing, and producers (consumers) may then take shorter (less long) 
hedging positions than they would otherwise. The increase in net short hedging requires a 
matching increase in net long speculation. In order to induce speculators to take more long 
positions in this setting, the futures price ought to be lower than it would be in absence of the 
hazard-fear; formally, 	, ≡ , −  < 0 with , = , +
	, and 	, < 0 is the premium induced by the supply-increasing 
or demand-reducing hazard fear mispricing. The rise in the futures price as maturity approaches 
(premium earned by long speculators) thus incorporates both a fundamental and a fear element. 
                                                                 
with exposure to summer crop production in Latin America, namely CBOT Soybeans, CBOT 
Corn, ICE #11 Sugar and also ICE Arabica Coffee”.  
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Building on economic psychology, we hypothesize that economic agents’ fear of threats 
induces them to search for information (Lemieux and Peterson, 2011). This active information 
demand is referred to as “attention” in the recent asset pricing literature (Da et al., 2011, 2015; 
Han et al., 2017a, 2017b; Vozlyublennaia, 2014).4 Motivated by this literature, we employ as 
proxy for attention to hazards the volume of Google search queries by keywords representing 
149 hazards in the weather, agricultural disease, geopolitical and economic categories. Thus, 
upsurges in the search queries can signal hazard fear. We conjecture that this fear can 
temporarily deviate the futures price above or below its fundamental value depending on 
whether the underlying hazard shifts the supply and demand curves inward or outward. 
Economic agents’ fear can occur for many reasons. Building on the aforementioned 
literature on the pricing content of “attention” we are agnostic as to whether the internet 
searches are induced by news releases about impending hazards or simply by a phenomenon 
akin to the “representativeness” heuristic – when people witness a salient event their level of 
fear can increase independently of any economic loss they incur. For instance, a coffee 
producer may be anxious about the possibility of a severe frost pre-harvest because her crops 
were affected by such a frost in the past or because she is mindful of other extreme weather 
phenomena that had dramatically shifted inward the commodity supply curve.5  
 Following the above intuition, the paper contributions are threefold. Using the changes in 
internet search volume by 149 commodity-hazard keywords as proxy for fear surges, we adapt 
                                                                 
4
 There is a parallel literature, largely initiated by Tetlock (2007), which establishes instead 
that variables related to the information supply such as the media count (number of news 
articles published) or the media tone (positive or negative articles) can influence asset prices.  
5
 The representativeness heuristic was first described by psychologists Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman during the 1970s as a mental shortcut by which agents estimate the 
likelihood of an event by comparing it to an existing prototype that already exists in their minds 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When agents act on the basis of representativeness, they are 
more likely to make more errors by overestimating the likelihood that something will occur.  
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the setting of Da et al. (2015) to obtain a signal for each commodity futures (hereafter CFEAR) 
that reflects the nexus between past returns and hazard fear. Second, we deploy a novel CFEAR 
portfolio strategy that sells the commodities that appreciated the most under the influence of 
supply-decreasing or demand-increasing fears and buys the commodities that depreciated the 
most under the influence of supply-increasing or demand-decreasing fears. We formally assess 
the out-of-sample performance of the CFEAR portfolio and deploy time-series spanning tests 
to test whether the fear premium thus captured is subsumed by known systematic risk factors. 
Third, contributing to the commodity pricing literature, we deploy cross-sectional tests for 
commodity portfolios (sorted on characteristics and sectors) and individual commodities to test 
whether the CFEAR factor has any pricing ability beyond known systematic risk factors.  
We find that the long-short CFEAR portfolio captures an economically and statistically 
significant mean excess return of 9.28% per annum (t = 3.35). This sizeable CFEAR premium 
translates into a Sharpe ratio of 0.90 that is very attractive compared to the Sharpe ratios of 
extant long-short commodity strategies. The CFEAR premium relates to, but is not subsumed 
by, fundamental risk factors (basis, momentum and convexity), tail risk factors (skewness, left- 
and right-tail risk), liquidity, and volatility risk factors (basis-momentum and liquidity risk). 
Consistent with these time-series spanning tests, cross-sectional pricing tests further suggest 
that the CFEAR factor has significant pricing ability beyond these factors.  
Further analysis reveals a link between the CFEAR premium and overall financial market 
sentiment as proxied by CBOE’s VIX.6 The short leg of the portfolio, which is the main driver 
                                                                 
6 The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) market volatility index (VIX) measures the 
implied volatility of options on the S&P 500 stock index. Referred to as the “investor fear 
gauge” by practitioners, VIX exhibits higher levels in periods of financial market turmoil and 
investor fear (see e.g., Whaley, 2000). Thus, it has been employed as proxy for investors’ 
sentiment (moods and beliefs); see e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Da et al. (2015). Gao 
and Süss (2015) employ it as sentiment measure in a commodity futures markets study arguing 
that since the equity market is still by far the most liquid, proxies from this market can be taken 
as representative of general financial market sentiment.  
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of the CFEAR premium, is made up of commodity futures contracts that are more sentiment-
prone, and the CFEAR premium is significantly larger in periods of pessimism. This evidence 
is in line with the wisdom from human psychology (behavioural finance) that investors are 
more vulnerable to the fear emotion when they find themselves outside of their “comfort zones” 
due to market instability or large losses (Shefrin, 2002). The finding of a greater CFEAR 
premium in periods of overall financial market pessimism is also in line with the prediction 
from behavioural finance models that the higher capital constraints of informed investors 
and/or their lower risk absorption capacity during turmoil periods can hinder the arbitrage 
trades that are required to eliminate any mispricing (DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Barberis et al., 1998; Cheng et al., 2015).  
This study is inspired by a nascent commodity markets literature which investigates the 
out-of-sample predictive linkages between investor attention (as proxied by internet searches) 
and commodity returns (Han et al., 2017a, 2017b; Vozlyublennaia, 2014).7 In a broader 
literature, the Google search volume has been endorsed as a useful out-of-sample predictor of 
equity returns (Da et al., 2011, 2015; Ben-Rephael et al., 2017; Dzielinski et al., 2018), 
sovereign credit spreads (Dergiades et al., 2015), and macroeconomic variables such as 
unemployment (D’Amuri and Marcucci, 2017; Niesert et al., 2019) inter alia. 
Second, our work serves to emphasize the contention by Gao and Süss (2015) that 
sentiment plays a role in explaining commodity futures returns. Gao and Süss (2015) show that 
                                                                 
7
 Through the lens of purely statistical criteria such as mean squared forecast errors, Han et al., 
(2017a) find that the Google search volume by oil- and real economy-related keywords are 
good predictors of oil futures returns relative to the historical average benchmark. Han et al. 
(2017b) find that the predictive errors of commodity return models that include various 
macroeconomic variables decrease by adding as predictor the Google search volume by 13 
commodity names and combinations thereof with various terms (e.g. cost, price, production 
and supply). Using Google searches by gold price and oil price as keywords, Vozlyublennaia 
(2014) finds that more attention decreases predictability (the ability of current/past returns to 
convey information about future returns) and thus argues that pricing efficiency increases. 
8 
 
commodity futures with low dollar open interest, high volatility, poor past performance, or low 
basis are more sensitive to sentiment in the sense that they perform worse when the overall 
financial markets are bearish or pessimistic. In a similar vein, we find that the CFEAR portfolio 
performance is driven by the short leg which is typically made up of commodities with these 
characteristics; thus, our findings also re-affirm the Gao and Süss (2015) contention that 
general financial market sentiment can drive the performance of commodity futures portfolios.  
Finally, this study contributes to the increasing stream of literature on commodity futures 
pricing by showing that fear of weather, agricultural diseases, political or economic hazards 
affects pricing beyond exposure to known systematic risk factors relating to momentum, basis, 
hedging pressure, convexity, skewness, basis-momentum, market liquidity or volatility (e.g., 
Erb and Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Miffre and Rallis, 2007; Basu and 
Miffre, 2013; Szymanowska et al., 2014; Bakshi et al., 2019; Fernandez-Perez et al., 2018; 
Boons and Prado, 2019; Gu et al., 2019, amongst others). The paper not only sheds light on 
commodity futures pricing but also informs the design of practical investment solutions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the commodity-specific 
CFEAR characteristic and long-short CFEAR portfolio construction methodology in Section 
2. Data and benchmarks are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents tests of hazard fear as 
pricing signal through time-series spanning tests and cross-sectional tests, and examines its 
potential drivers. Section 5 provides extensions and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
An online Annex provides details of further robustness checks and additional analyses. 
2. COMMODITY HAZARD-FEAR  
2.1. Google search volume data 
Inspired by the extant literature that uses Google search volume as proxy for investor attention 
(or information demand) our paper introduces a commodity hazard-fear characteristic that is 
constructed from internet search volume data from Google Trends. By contrast with extant 
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papers (e.g., Da et al., 2011; Vozlyublennaia, 2014; Han et al., 2017a,b), we are concerned with 
the role of attention about potential threats to the commodity supply/demand; hence, the search 
query terms are hazard fear keywords (see Table 1) instead of the commodity names or tickers. 
Google organizes the searches by their origin as region versus worldwide. We use worldwide 
search data in the main empirical section and U.S. data in the robustness section. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Using various sources (Iizumi and Ramankutty, 2015; Israel and Briones, 2013; United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018; and reports from Material Risk Insights8), 
we compile a list of primary keywords that reflect commodity price risks associated with 
weather (WE), agricultural diseases (DI), geopolitical (GP), or economic (EC) threats. Next, 
as in Da et al. (2015), we refine the primary keywords by examining the top ten related searches 
(provided by Google Trends) and from these we filter out the irrelevant keywords.9 Finally, we 
add to the latter the risk and warning terms, e.g. we consider tsunami, tsunami risk and tsunami 
warning. We thus end up with  = 149 keywords as listed in Table 1 by category: 113 weather 
(WE), 10 agricultural diseases (DI), 14 geopolitical (GP) and 12 economic (EC) hazards.  
A spell of extreme cold or a frost are examples of WE hazards that could damage the growth 
of cotton while simultaneously increase the demand of natural gas for heating purposes; 
extremely dry weather or wet weather may adversely affect the harvest of sugar and cocoa that 
thrive in the right mix of rain and sunshine. Among the DI hazards, an increase of crop diseases 
is likely to reduce the supply of grain commodities, and an outbreak of La Roya fungus is likely 
to reduce the supply of coffee. GE hazards such as the Russian crisis are threats to the supply 
of natural gas; likewise, a Middle East conflict may damage oil provision. Recession or crisis 
                                                                 
8
 See www.materials-risk.com. 
9
 For instance, one of the top related searches to hail damage is hail storm which we retain 
while we neglect searches by flood lights that is unrelated to the paper aim. 
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are EC hazards that may reduce the demand for copper or oil due to a slowdown in business 
activity, while the demand for gold may simultaneously rise as gold is a safe-haven. 
Let j denote a search keyword and t a sample week. Google Trends first obtains the ratio 
between the volume of queries associated with keyword j during week t, denoted $%,, and the 
entire volume of queries for any keyword in the same time period, denoted $&,. The ratio 
$%,/$&, is subsequently divided by its historical maximum value and multiplied by a factor of 
100 to scale it between 0 and 100. The resulting variable, (%,, is the Google Search Volume 
Index (GSVI) provided by Google Trends which has the interpretation of a search probability: 
(%, equals 0 if the jth keyword is not searched at all on week t and equals 100 in the peak search 
week of the keyword. The Google searches (%, are sampled at a weekly frequency with each 
observation capturing the search queries from Monday 00:00:00 to Sunday 23:59:59.10  
To increase the response speed, Google Trends compiles the GSVI data using a random 
subset of the actual historical search data and therefore the GSVI time-series downloaded on 
two different dates )* and )+ can differ, {(%,}./  ≠ {(%,}.1; for further details, see Stephen-
Davidowitz and Varian (2015). Following extant studies (see e.g.  Da et al., 2011; McLaren 
and Shanbhogue, 2011), we download GSVI series for each of the J=149 keywords on six 
different dates (5th, 6th, 7th, 16th, 17th and 18th February 2019)11 and define the search series for 
our analysis as their average, i.e. (%, ≡ *2 ∑ {(%,}.2.4* . Table A.1 in the online Annex 
summarizes the 149 raw time-series of searches thus obtained {(%,}, 5 = 1, … 149.  
                                                                 
10
 We download Google Search Volume Index (GSVI) data at the weekly frequency. The 
weekly Google search data is characterized by a better information-to-noise ratio (than monthly 
or daily data); namely, weekly data ought to reflect the dynamics of attention in financial 
markets better than the coarser monthly data while circumventing the noise that characterizes 
daily data (e.g. Da et al., 2011; Vozlyublennaia, 2014; Dergiades et al., 2015; D’Amuri and 
Marcucci, 2017; Gao et al., 2020).  
11
 The average pairwise correlation between the Google search series retrieved on the above 6 
dates exceeds 90% for 55 out of the 149 search terms and the average correlation is 78%. 
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As an illustration, Figure 1, Panel A shows the evolution of the Google search index (%, for 
the keyword hurricane, and the average price of lumber futures (front-contract) in each sample 
month. We observe that the peaks in Google searches by hurricane precede the occurrence of 
most notorious hurricanes such as, for instance, Hurricane Irma on September 2017, and tend 
to coincide with, or be quickly followed by, a jump in lumber futures prices which later adjust 
downwards. Similar patterns are observed in Panel B for ebola searches versus live/feeder 
cattle futures prices, and in Panel C for oil crisis searches versus natural gas futures prices. 
However, the opposite is observed in Panel D where increases in Google searches by 
unemployment (a demand-reduction related fear) are associated with decreases in the price of 
natural gas futures contracts, which later gradually adjust upwards. We cannot and do not assert 
that the agents behind these searches are exclusively commodity market participants; what is 
key for the present purposes, as these graphical examples prima facie suggest, is that the surges 
in the searches convey fear. Likewise, the fear and, in turn, the attention to hazards may be 
triggered by current news or by intrinsic concerns driven, for instance, by memory of extreme 
weather phenomena that occurred in the past or by extrapolating hazards that have affected 
other markets (representative heuristic). 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
As in Da et al. (2015), the measure of interest is the weekly log change in the Google 
search volume or attention to hazard j defined as ∆%, ≡ ln((%,/(%,*), 5 = 1, … ,  , so that 
sharp increases in the attention to hazards can be taken to signal a surge in hazard-specific fear. 
Using search changes conveniently eliminates the look-ahead bias in GSVI induced by the 
aforementioned division of $%,/$&, by its maximum historical value; this ensures that the 
hazard-fear portfolio uses information that is available at the time of portfolio formation. 
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2.2. CFEAR portfolio construction 
This section defines the so-called >?@A characteristic and uses it as signal for asset 
allocation. Note that to avoid a look-ahead bias the analysis is conducted out-of-sample; 
namely, the buy or sell decisions made at the end of each Monday hinge only on past data. The 
CFEAR portfolio formation methodology unfolds as follows.  
At stage one, at each portfolio formation time t (Monday) we begin by standardizing the 
weekly histories of searches ∆%, like Da et al. (2015) as ∆%,∗ ≡ ∆%,/C%,∆D for each keyword 
5 = 1, … ,149 where C%,∆D is the standard deviation of ∆%, using past data over the preceding E 
weeks. This standardization ensures that the ∆%, series are comparable across keywords.  
At step two, following Da et al. (2015), we estimate for each of the commodities ( =
1, … , F) in the sample as many OLS regressions as hazard keywords ( = 149 regressions); 
each regression is aimed at measuring the strength of the relation between commodity futures 
returns and the surge in hazard fear over the preceding E weeks 
A,G = H + IA,% ∙ ∆%,G∗ + KA,G , L = 0, … , E − 1  (1) 
and finally, at step 3, we obtain a CFEAR characteristic (or signal) for commodity i by 
aggregating the estimated IA,% coefficients across all the  = 149 keywords as 
>?@A, ≡ ∑ IMA,%N%4*       (2) 
By contrast, in their analysis of the impact of attention in equity markets Da et al. (2015) retain 
only the keywords with the most negative slopes in Equation (1); the reason is that they are 
concerned with falling equity prices since long positions by and large predominate. In the case 
of assets in zero net supply, such as commodity futures, falling prices are undesirable to long 
traders but desirable to short traders and thus, we consider all slope coefficients regardless of 
their sign. What is important is that, given the prior standardization, the most (least) relevant 
keywords for a given commodity will be revealed through a large (small) absolute IMA,% 
13 
 
coefficient. For instance, a large positive >?@A, indicates that the price of commodity i co-
moved positively with hazard fear and thus that the net effect of hazard fear was of a supply-
reducing or demand-enhancing nature; vice versa, a large negative >?@A, suggests that the 
price of commodity i co-moved negatively with hazard fear and thus that the net effect of 
hazard fear was of a supply-increasing or demand-reducing nature.  
Next we sort the available cross-section of futures contracts at each portfolio formation 
time t on >?@A,; short those in the top quintile(Q5) with the largest >?@A, and long those 
in the bottom quintile(Q1) with the smallest >?@A,. The constituents of the long and short 
portfolios are equally weighted, the positions are fully collateralized and held for a week.  
The above procedure is repeated at the next portfolio formation time (next Monday end) 
with expanding estimation windows at steps one and two, until the sample ends. The use of 
increasing windows builds on Da et al. (2015) and is aimed at maximizing the accuracy of the 
CFEAR estimation. The intuition is that the hazards are, by definition, infrequent and therefore, 
a fixed-length (rolling) estimation window for Equation (1) of, say, one to five years may be 
too short, resulting in too noisy IA,% measures. Using longer windows reduces considerably 
the sample of portfolio returns. We revisit this issue in the robustness tests section of the paper. 
3. DATA AND ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS 
3.1. Data 
Similar to the cross-section of extant commodities studies (e.g., Basu and Miffre, 2013; Bianchi 
et al., 2015; Boons and Prado, 2019) our study is based on data for 28 commodity futures 
contracts, as listed in Table 2, which comprise 17 agricultural (4 cereal grains, 4 oilseeds, 4 
meats, 5 miscellaneous other softs), 6 energy, and 5 metals (1 base, 4 precious). The first 
observation is from January 2004 as dictated by the availability of weekly Google Trends 
14 
 
search data. Since 52 past weeks of data are required to construct the first portfolio, the 
portfolios are formed over the period January 2005 to December 2018. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 We measure futures returns as A, = ln O PQ,RPQ,RS/T where A, is the Monday settlement price 
of front contracts in non-maturity months or second-nearest contracts otherwise – the data 
source is Thomson Reuters Datastream. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the futures 
returns (mean, standard deviation, first-order autocorrelation, and Ljung-Box test statistic for 
the null hypothesis that the first four autocorrelations are jointly zero). Weekly returns show 
little evidence of predictability based on sample autocorrelations; the Ljung-Box test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 5% level only for copper, gasoline RBOB, live 
cattle and sugar. Table 2 also reveals that the weekly CFEAR signal, as defined in Equation 
(2), shows variability across commodities, ranging from -0.08 (Cocoa) to 0.24 (Gasoline 
RBOB), with an average coefficient of variation (standard deviation per absolute mean) of 3.62. 
3.2. Performance evaluation benchmarks 
Throughout the paper, the performance of the CFEAR portfolio is appraised in the context of 
a battery of benchmarks. Following Erb and Harvey (2006), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) 
and Bakshi et al. (2019), we first consider a long-only equally-weighted and weekly-rebalanced 
portfolio of all commodities (AVG) as a possible risk factor that explains CFEAR. Additional 
benchmarks emanate from the literature on either commodity futures pricing, in particular, or 
asset pricing more generally. The risk factors we use are long-short portfolios that relate to the 
fundamentals of backwardation and contango: backwardated commodities with high basis (Erb 
and Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Bakshi et al., 2019), good past performance 
(Erb and Harvey, 2006; Miffre and Rallis, 2007; Bakshi et al., 2019), net short hedging or net 
long speculating (Basu and Miffre, 2013; Bianchi et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2019) or a convex 
price curve (Gu et al., 2019) are expected to outperform contangoed commodities whose 
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characteristics are at the other end of the spectrum. Other long-short benchmarks relate to tail 
risks as measured by skewness (Fernandez-Perez et al., 2018), 1% and 99% Value-at-Risk, 
hereafter denoted as VaR1 and VaR99 (Bali et al., 2009; Atilgan et al, 2019);12 the goal is to 
test whether the CFEAR premium is a tail risk premium in disguise. Finally, we test whether 
the CFEAR premium relates to liquidity and volatility risks as modeled through basis-
momentum (Boons and Prado, 2019) and liquidity (Amihud, 2002) portfolios. 
Appendix A, Panel B, lists the k characteristics used in the construction of the long-short 
risk factors and outlines the portfolio construction method. As with the CFEAR characteristic, 
we sort the futures contracts at the end of each Monday by each of these k characteristics in 
turn, buy the quintile deemed to appreciate, short the quintile deemed to depreciate, assign 
equal weights to the constituents and hold the fully-collateralized positions for a week. The 
right-hand side of Appendix A presents summary statistics for the long-only and long-short 
characteristic-sorted portfolios; the strategies based on hedging pressure, convexity, skewness, 
and basis-momentum stand out with Sharpe ratios ranging from 0.45 to 0.59.  
4. IS HAZARD-FEAR PRICED?  
This section measures the CFEAR factor and accesses whether its performance reflects 
compensation for exposure to risk or to sentiment. The analysis is conducted using both time-
series spanning tests and cross-sectional pricing tests that control for other factors.  
4.1. Performance of the CFEAR portfolio 
Table 3 summarizes the performance of the CFEAR-sorted quintiles and that of the long-short 
CFEAR portfolio over the period January 2005 to December 2018. We observe a decrease in 
                                                                 
12
 As dictated by rational asset pricing theory, higher risk shall be compensated by higher 
expected returns. Thus the skewness, VaR1 and VaR99 factors are constructed as the returns 
of portfolios with long positions in the commodity futures with the lowest skewness, the most 
negative VaR1 or the least positive VaR99 and short positions in the commodity futures with 
the highest skewness, the least negative VaR1 or the most positive VaR99. 
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the excess returns of the CFEAR-sorted quintiles from 4.35% (Q1) to -14.21% (Q5). The fully-
collateralized Q1-Q5 portfolio captures an economically and statistically significant premium 
of 9.28% p.a. (U-statistic = 3.35) which suggests that the CFEAR signal contains useful out-of-
sample predictive information for commodity excess returns. The CFEAR portfolio returns 
translate into a Sharpe ratio of 0.9012 which is higher than that of the alternative portfolios 
considered in Appendix A. The CFEAR portfolio stands out as regards tail/crash risk as 
suggested, for instance, by a maximum drawdown of -0.1881, while the corresponding figures 
for the long-only and long-short commodity portfolios lie in the ranges [-0.5392, -0.1828].13  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Examining the excess returns of the long versus short leg of the CFEAR portfolio reveals 
that the premium is mostly driven by the substantial drop in price of the commodity futures 
contracts with the most positive >?@A, characteristic; namely, the short leg of the portfolio 
yields a large negative mean excess return of -14.21% p.a. (U =  −2.59). With an annualized 
mean excess return of 4.35% (U =  0.96), the constituents of the long portfolio contribute much 
less to the overall performance. We will elaborate on this finding in Section 4.3. 
Are a few specific commodities driving the performance of the CFEAR portfolio? 
Towards addressing this question, and confirming the results of Table 2, Figure 2 shows that 
the frequency with which a given commodity is included in the Q1 or Q5 portfolio is often 
below 50% revealing that the CFEAR portfolio composition varies. The energy commodities 
                                                                 
13
 We also deploy the CFEAR portfolio on second-end contracts and spreads (front- minus 
second-end contracts) using the same sorting signal from Equation (2). The results presented 
in the online Annex Table A.2 confirm the attractive predictive ability of the CFEAR signal 
vis-à-vis other signals. We also gauge the relative merit of the keyword groups (weather, WE; 
agricultural diseases, DI; geopolitical, GP; and economic, EC) by implementing the CFEAR 
strategy on keyword sets that exclude one group at a time. The results shown in the online 
Annex Table A.3 highlight the importance of the WE group which is perhaps not surprising 
given that the supply/demand of many commodities is fundamentally linked to the weather. 
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are more often in the short Q5 (than in the long Q1) portfolio which indicates that on average 
the fear they are exposed to is associated with supply-reducing or demand-increasing hazards.  
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
Figure 3 plots the future value of $1 invested in the long-short CFEAR portfolio, long-
only AVG portfolio and long-short alternative portfolios; see Appendix A. Confirming our 
earlier findings (c.f. Table 3), Figure 2 reveals that the CFEAR strategy is relatively attractive.14  
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
4.2. Are the CFEAR returns compensation for extant risks? 
Time-series spanning tests 
The analysis thus far has revealed that the CFEAR strategy is able to capture attractive mean 
excess returns in commodity futures markets. We now test whether the significant CFEAR 
premium is merely compensation for exposure to risk factors. For this purpose, we start off 
with the three-factor model of Bakshi et al. (2019) that includes the AVG, basis and momentum 
risk factors and estimate an OLS time-series spanning regression for the excess returns of the 
CFEAR portfolio. We then augment this baseline specification with various factors, in turn, 
that emanate from the literature on the pricing of commodity futures (hedging pressure and 
convexity), tail-risk (skewness, VaR1 and VaR99) or for the liquidity and volatility of 
commodities (basis-momentum and illiquidity). For each of the specifications, we look at the 
sign and significance of both the betas and alpha where the latter represents the average excess 
return of the CFEAR portfolio that is not a compensation for the hypothesized risk factors.  
                                                                 
14
 As Figure 2 reveals, the CFEAR strategy pulled itself apart from the alternative strategies 
especially from June 2014 up until February 2016, a period during which the broad commodity 
market was in downfall as reflected in the AVG portfolio returns. Unreported results suggest 
that this is because the CFEAR signal was able to “time” the decline of certain commodities 
(especially, crude oil) much more accurately than the alternative signals. 
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Table 4 reports the results and shows that the excess returns of the CFEAR portfolio are 
sensitive to many of the risk factors considered. For example, the CFEAR portfolio returns 
exhibit positive momentum, convexity, skewness, VaR99 and basis-momentum betas, and 
negative basis, VaR1 and liquidity betas.15 As argued by Boons and Prado (2019), given that 
basis-momentum proxies for volatility and liquidity risks, the positive slope of the basis-
momentum factor and the negative slope on the liquidity risk factor indicate that lack of 
liquidity is an important driver of the performance of the CFEAR portfolio. In fact of all the 
risk factors considered, lack of liquidity is the most important factor as highlighted by a highly 
significant slope coefficient on the liquidity risk factor and by a substantial increase in adjusted-
R2 when moving from the baseline model to a model that includes the liquidity risk premium. 
The last column of Table 4 reports the “kitchen-sink” model that includes all the risk factors. 
The only surviving factors are basis, momentum, convexity and liquidity with the liquidity risk 
factor still presenting the most significant slope coefficient. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Despite the significant risk factor exposures, the CFEAR portfolio affords economically 
sizeable and statistically significant alphas that range from 8.23% p.a. (U = 3.35) to 9.47% p.a. 
(U = 3.73). Thus, compensation for risk factor exposures does not tell the whole story.  
Cross-sectional pricing tests 
We complement the above time-series spanning tests with cross-sectional pricing tests to 
establish if the CFEAR factor is priced over and above extant risk factors. Following Kan et 
al. (2013) and Boons and Prado (2019) inter alia, using a set of portfolios as test assets  =
1, … , F we first estimate full-sample betas via OLS time-series regressions 
                                                                 
15
 The positive betas on skewness and VaR99 are consistent with investors’ preferences for 
lottery-type assets as predicted by cumulative prospect theory (Barberis and Huang, 2008). The 
negative beta on the VaR1 factor is consistent with a market’s slow assimilation of bad news 
as argued by Altigan et al. (2019) in line with the behavioral model of Hong et al. (2000).  
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A, = HA + [A ∙ \ + KA,, U = 1, … ,                                          (3) 
where A, is the time t excess returns of (a) the quintile portfolios based on CFEAR, (b) the 
quintile portfolios based on the 9 characteristics listed in Appendix A (Panel B), and (c) the 
equally-weighted and weekly-rebalanced portfolios from the 6 commodity sub-sectors reported 
in Table 2 (with precious and base metals as a unique sector); thus, we have F = 56 commodity 
portfolios altogether. \ includes the CFEAR factor as well as the 10 systematic risk factors 
that can potentially price the cross-section of portfolio returns (Appendix A, Panels A and B) 
and KA, is an error term. At step two, we estimate on each week the following cross-sectional 
regression of average excess returns on the step-one estimated full-sample betas  
̅A = ^_ + `[aA + bA,  = 1, … , F                    (4) 
where ` is a vector containing the prices of risk associated with each of the factors.  
We consider two types of models. The baseline model entertains the three risk-factors of 
Bakshi et al. (2019). We subsequently expand this model by cycling through each of the 
additional long-short risk premia considered in the time-series spanning tests, and then all 
together (“kitchen-sink” model). The second set of models adds to these pricing models the 
CFEAR factor. We assess the added value of the CFEAR factor through the adjusted-@+(%) 
and mean absolute pricing error, d?(%) = *__e ∑ |bÂ|eA4*  of each model (Equation (4)). 
Table 5 reports the OLS estimates h M^_, i`  j, and significance t-tests based on the Shanken (1992) 
robust standard errors (UD, to correct for error-in-variables in [a) and the Kan et al. (2013) 
standard errors (UkD, to additionally correct for model misspecification).  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Irrespective of the model considered, the CFEAR factor is positively priced (at 8.73% p.a. 
on average across models) with significance Shanken t-statistics ranging from 2.54 to 2.92 
across the various specifications of the risk-return relationship. Thus, the pricing ability of 
CFEAR cannot be fully rationalized by the fundamentals of backwardation and contango, nor 
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by tail risks, liquidity and volatility risks. The models that include the CFEAR factor show a 
notable improvement in cross-sectional fit (versus the counterpart models that exclude it) by 
21.79 percentage points (pp) on average in terms of adjusted-@+ and by 0.0084pp on average 
in terms of MAPE; hence, CFEAR is an important driver of commodity returns.16  
As Daskalaki et al. (2014) inter alia argue, a bias may emerge as regards the significance 
of the prices of risk when the test assets are portfolios sorted by the same criterion used to 
construct the risk factors. We address this bias by employing as test assets the 28 individual 
commodities, and estimating time-varying betas over a 52-week window at the first step as in 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) or Boons and Prado (2019), and sequential weekly cross-sectional 
OLS regressions at the second step. The results gathered in the online Annex Table A.5 do not 
challenge the main findings (Table 5); the CFEAR factor is positively priced and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better in all models, and at 7.69% a year on average across models.  
4.3. Does the CFEAR effect relate to overall financial market sentiment? 
The main finding hitherto is that known risk factors provide only a partial explanation for the 
observed CFEAR premium. This section explores the role of sentiment in financial markets. 
CFEAR premium and overall financial market sentiment 
We begin by summarizing in Table 6 the characteristics of the commodities allocated over time 
to each of the CFEAR quintiles. The CFEAR characteristic is reported in the first row, and the 
basis, momentum, hedging pressure, convexity, skewness, VaR1, VaR99, basis-momentum 
and liquidity signals, as defined in Appendix A, in subsequent rows. The last two rows of the 
table report the realized variance defined as the average squared daily return over the 22 days 
                                                                 
16
 For the sake of completeness, we augment the baseline time-series pricing model of Bakshi 
et al. (2019) with the change in EPU index (Economic Policy Uncertainty; Baker et al., 2016) 
or the change in GPR index (GeoPolitical Risk; Caldara and Iacoviello, 2018). None of these 
variables is found significantly to explain the CFEAR premium. The cross-sectional pricing 
tests reaffirm this finding. Detailed results are available in Table A.4 of the online Annex.  
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preceding portfolio formation week t (e.g. Boons and Prado, 2019) as well as their dollar open 
interest defined as the product of the number of outstanding contracts (or open interest), 
contract size and the front-end futures settlement price (e.g. Gao and Süss, 2015). It is 
noticeable that the commodities in Q5 exhibit significantly greater illiquidity, variance and 
lottery-like payoffs, and significantly inferior past performance (momentum), smaller dollar 
open interest, and basis than those in Q1; the characteristics exhibited by the Q5 constituents 
are precisely those typical of sentiment-sensitive assets according to Baker and Wurgler (2006, 
2007) and Gao and Süss (2015). Thus, the earlier finding that the CFEAR premium is driven 
by the commodities in the short Q5 leg (c.f., Table 3), alongside the present finding that these 
commodities are relatively high sentiment-sensitive represents preliminarily evidence to 
suggest that overall financial market sentiment plays some role in the CFEAR premium.  
[Insert Table 6 around here]  
Deepening our analysis of the role of sentiment in the pricing of CFEAR, we test whether 
there is any difference in the magnitude of the premium captured by the CFEAR strategy in 
periods of low financial market sentiment (or pessimism) associated with high VIX levels, and 
periods of high financial market sentiment (or optimism) associated with low VIX levels. For 
this purpose, we estimate by OLS the following weekly time-series regression  
, = H_ + Hlmn ∙  o*lmn + [A ∙ \ + p , U = 1, … ,       (5) 
where , is the excess return of the CFEAR portfolio from week U − 1 to week U, o*lmn is 
a VIX dummy equal to 1 if the VIX level at U − 1 is higher than its full sample average and 0 
otherwise, and \ are the three risk factors of Bakshi et al. (2019); namely, the AVG, basis and 
momentum factors. Accordingly, the parameters H_ + Hlmn  and H_ capture the CFEAR alpha 
in high- and low-VIX states, respectively. By setting [A = q, the parameters H_ + Hlmn and H_ 
capture the CFEAR premium in high- and low-VIX states, respectively.  
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The results in Table 7, Panel A, reveal that the CFEAR premium is larger when VIX takes 
on high values; namely, when the overall financial market sentiment is pessimistic.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
For example, the mean excess return of the CFEAR portfolio in high-VIX states statistically 
exceed that in low-VIX states by 14.19% (t-statistic of 2.48 for the difference in performance). 
Similarly, the alpha of the CFEAR portfolio relative to the Bakshi et al. (2019) model in high-
VIX states (19.16%, t-statistic of 4.44) statistically exceeds that obtained in low-VIX states 
(4.26%, t-statistic of 1.39). Looking at the short leg of the CFEAR portfolio more specifically, 
we note that it performs particularly poorly in high-VIX states: the average excess return of the 
short leg is then statistically lower (at -30.68%, t-statistic of -2.82) than that obtained in low-
VIX states (at -5.26%, t-statistic of -0.94). Thus, general pessimism in financial markets 
magnifies the hazard fear in commodity markets.  
The finding that the CFEAR premium is greater in periods when general financial market 
sentiment is pessimistic can be rationalized in two related ways. Firstly, one intuitive 
explanation stemming from the behavioral finance literature is that investors become more 
vulnerable to the hazard-fear emotion when they find themselves outside of their “comfort 
zone” due to large market instability or sizeable losses; e.g., see discussion in Shefrin (2002). 
Secondly, the aforesaid finding is also consistent with predictions from extant behavioral 
finance models which establish that financial markets are affected by moods-driven traders 
(DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Barberis et al., 1998). The common 
denominator to these models is that arbitrageurs (that is, informed traders who bet against the 
mispricing induced by moods-driven traders) may be deterred from trading away such 
mispricing for different reasons. One is that they fear that the mood of irrational traders could 
go on to become more extreme and thus prices could deviate further from their fundamental 
values in periods of extreme sentiment. Bearing this risk in mind, informed speculators may 
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opt at least in the short run to not arbitrage away the mispricing of commodity futures. As a 
result, emotions such as hazard-fear end up impacting equilibrium futures prices in the short 
run and more so during periods of extreme sentiment such as pessimistic periods.  
Cheng et al. (2015) provide evidence that when VIX increases, the positions of commodity 
futures arbitrageurs decrease as a reflection of their more constrained capital and/or their lower 
risk-absorption capacity during these periods; for instance, arbitrage capital was largely 
withdrawn from the commodity futures market over the late 2000s Global Financial Crisis. 
Acharya et al. (2013) formalize a model where commodity futures speculators are capital 
constrained during stress periods. Thus we conjecture that the CFEAR premium reflects a 
mispricing driven by hazard-fear and a subsequent correction; speculators fail to arbitrage away 
the perceived mispricing because of their binding funding constraints and/or lesser risk- 
absorption capacity in periods of general market pessimism or turmoil periods. To gauge this 
conjecture, using Equation (5) reformulated with a TED (three-month Treasury bill minus 
three-month LIBOR in US dollars) dummy variable as a proxy of funding liquidity risk, we 
obtain the mean excess return and the Bakshi et al. (2019) alpha in periods of high versus low 
TED for the CFEAR portfolio and for its long and short legs. As Table 7 (Panel B) shows, the 
absolute excess return of the short (Q5) leg is much higher in the high TED period at -21.99% 
p.a. than in the low TED period at -11.24% p.a.; a similar contrast is observed for the alpha. 
By contrast, a much smaller difference between high and low TED periods is observed in the 
mean excess return and alpha of the long (Q1) leg.17 
 
 
                                                                 
17 These differences in high versus low TED states are economically significant but not 
statistically significant which may be explained by the small number of observations on the 
high TED states (197 weeks or 27%) relative to the low TED states (534 weeks or 73%).  
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Day-of-the-week performance 
The CFEAR signals are measured at the end of each Monday using past weekly returns and 
past Google searches data as detailed in the methodology section. The long-short CFEAR 
portfolio is then held for a week; namely, from a given Monday-end to the next Monday-end. 
While maintaining the same methodology and the same one-week holding period, we now 
consider other days of the week as alternative portfolio formation times. Table 7 (Panel C) 
presents summary statistics for the performance of the resulting portfolios. We note a 
monotonic decrease in the CFEAR premium throughout the week. This pattern can be 
explained by the wisdom from the investor psychology literature that market participants are 
more pessimistic on Monday which could exacerbate any hazard fear and hence, the decrease 
in the futures price of the Q5 quintile constituents (negative return) will be larger. At the other 
extreme, part of the mispricing effect of hazard fear on the Q5 futures would be counteracted 
by the relative more optimistic mood that characterizes Friday (e.g., Birru, 2018). Given that 
the CFEAR premium derives mainly from the short leg (Table 3), it is perhaps not surprising 
to see that the short Q5 portfolio performs worse (at -14.21%) when formed on Mondays and 
relatively better (at -9.96%) when formed on Fridays. The improvement in Sharpe ratio of the 
short portfolio (Q5) over the week is quite noticeable. To add statistical significance, we deploy 
the Ledoit and Wolf (2008) test for the hypothesis r_: @tuvwQxyz ≤ @tu|}~xyz using a block 
size of 5. The corresponding p-value (0.0776) indicates rejection of the null at the 10% level.  
Summary and discussion 
Summing up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that sentiment plays a role in 
explaining the CFEAR premium. The commodity futures contracts in the Q5 quintile that 
drives most of the CFEAR portfolio performance 1) are swayed by sentiment, 2) accrue more 
negative weekly returns in high VIX (general financial market pessimism) than low VIX 
periods, and 3) accrue more negative weekly returns if the portfolio is formed on Monday when 
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traders are typically most pessimistic. Fear of any potential hazard that shifts downward the 
supply (or upward the demand) will increase net long hedging and, in turn, the current futures 
price relative to fundamentals to attract net short speculation. The subsequent gradual 
downward adjustment in the futures price (negative weekly return in our analysis) represents 
the correction of the mispricing induced by hazard fear. Our findings are consistent with the 
notion that informed speculators are reluctant to engage in arbitrage trades during periods of 
overall pessimistic moods not only because the mispricing could in fact worsen if the moods 
exacerbate (DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) but also because of the binding 
funding constraints that arbitrageurs face (Cheng et al., 2015). 
5. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The purpose of this section is to appraise the CFEAR premium after transaction costs, to cycle 
through several aspects of the CFEAR factor construction, and to deploy a placebo test. 
5.1. Turnover and transaction costs 
We measure the turnover () of a given portfolio as the average of all the trades incurred 
 = ** ∑ ∑ A,* − A,eA4**4*          (6) 
where U = 1, … ,  denotes the portfolio formation times, A, is the weight assigned to the ith 
commodity as dictated by a given strategy at week t, A, ≡ A, × Q,R/  is the actual portfolio 
weight right before the next rebalancing at U + 1, A,* is the weekly return of the ith commodity 
from week U to week U + 1. Thus the  measure captures also the mechanical evolution of 
the weights due to within-week price dynamics (e.g., A, increases to A,  when A,* > 0). 
We calculate the time t net return of the long-short portfolio P as 
 P,* = ∑ A,A,* − > ∑ A, − A,*eA4*eA4*                           (7) 
using proportional trading costs TC=8.6 bps (Marshall et al., 2012). Figure 4 shows the results.  
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
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As can be gleaned from Panel A of Figure 4, the CFEAR portfolio turnover (at 0.08) is 
notably inferior to that of the basis (0.38), momentum (0.27), skewness (0.21), basis-
momentum (0.23) and convexity (0.56) portfolios and comparable to the turnover of the 
remaining portfolios. As regards performance, unreported results show that after controlling 
for transaction costs the CFEAR premium decreases only slightly from 9.28% p.a. (t =3.35) to 
8.92% (t = 3.22), and it still represents a very attractive performance relative to alternative 
long-short strategies. On a risk-adjusted basis, the Sharpe ratios plotted in Panel B of Figure 4 
confirm that transaction costs subsume a small part of the performance of the CFEAR portfolio.  
5.2. Alternative approaches to measure the CFEAR characteristic  
This section provides robustness tests related to the construction of the CFEAR signal.  
First, we consider US Google searches by the users’ IP address in place of the worldwide 
searches used thus far. Second, as in Da et al. (2015) we winsorize the Google search changes 
by shrinking the extreme ∆%, towards ∆%, ± 1.96C%,∆D where ∆%, is the mean of the time-
series associated with the search term j up to time t and C%,∆D its standard deviation. Third, we 
deseasonalize the searches ∆%, by regressing them on month dummies and retain the residuals, 
also as in Da et al. (2015). The rationale for omitting these two transformations in the main 
analysis is that our goal is to exploit surges in Google searches and by filtering out the large 
hazard-search changes through winsorization we may disregard valuable information. 
Likewise, many weather hazards (e.g., frosts or torrential rain) are seasonal and so the fear 
(proxied by the search activity) may capture seasonality that has valuable predictive content. 
Fourth, in order to focus on the possible distortions induced by the weeks with 0 searches 
((%, = 0 which we replace by a very small arbitrary non-zero value 10-11 in the main analysis 
to circumvent the logarithmic transformation issue), we provide three additional robustness 
checks for the long-short CFEAR portfolios constructed using the same methodology except 
for these changes: (i) as in Han et al. (2017b) we replace the 0s by 1s so that the 0s are then 
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turned into zero log search values, that is, ln(%, = 0, (ii) the 0s in the search series (%, are 
left as such and the Google search variable is instead defined as ∆%, = ln O *,R*,RS/T instead of 
∆%, = ln O ,R,RS/T, and (iii) although we consider weeks with zero searches informative, to 
dispel any remaining concerns, we remove the 0 data points from the calculations. These 
robustness checks are labelled (4a), (4b) and (4c), respectively. 
Fifth, we address the issue of noisy keywords by filtering out of the 149 original keywords 
those that meet any of these two criteria: (a) the time-series of weekly searches (%, contains 
more than % of 0s suggesting that the keyword is not popular, (b) the correlation among the 
6 series {(%,}. that form (%, on six different days d (Section 2.1) is less than % on average 
suggesting large sampling variability. We use {, } = {20,80} resulting in 72 keywords.18  
Sixth, we address concerns related to backdating by obtaining for each of the 149 keywords 
new weekly search histories {(%,}. on the following six days d = 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th and 
20th December 2019; we then define the search series per keyword (%, as *2 ∑ {(%,}.2.4* .  
Seventh, we measure the CFEAR signal in a manner that controls for the impact of media 
coverage (see e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009; Tetlock, 2015) by reformulating Equation (1) as  
A,G = H + IA,% ∙ ∆%,G∗ + A ∙ F(A,G + KA,G, L = 0, … , E − 1                 (8)  
F(A, denotes the amount of news coverage19 of commodity i in week t with a relevance 
score of either 25 or 75. The rest of the portfolio formation unfolds as before.  
                                                                 
18
 Qualitatively similar results are obtained with {, } = {10,90}. 
19
 We collect from WRDS-Ravenpack the weekly media coverage (or total number of news 
articles published from Monday to Sunday) per commodity. The WRDS-Ravenpack software 
assigns a score of 0 to 100 to each article to indicate how relevant the article is to the commodity 
at hand. For instance, a news article with relevance score of 0 for coffee means that coffee was 
only indirectly (passively) mentioned in the article, while an article with score 75 or higher is 
considered by WRDS-Ravenpack as extremely relevant to coffee (i.e., the commodity featured 
fairly prominently in the news story). Our main analysis is based on data extracted under the 
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Table 8 presents summary statistics for the performance of the resulting CFEAR portfolios. 
Irrespective of the approach used to measure the CFEAR characteristic, CFEAR is found to 
have predictive power over forthcoming futures returns. The Sharpe ratios, for example, range 
from 0.62 to 0.90 and thus are of a similar magnitude to that reported in Table 3 (0.90). Perhaps 
not surprisingly the winsorization and deseasonalization of the Google searches (columns (2) 
and (3)) as in Da et al. (2015) decreases the magnitude of the CFEAR premium, which serves 
to prove the informative content of extreme Google searches and the strong seasonality of the 
searches. Column (7) of Table 8 shows that taking on board media coverage does not alter the 
size and significance of the CFEAR premium. The rationale for this finding is twofold. On the 
one hand, as noted by Da et al. (2011), the response of prices to the demand of information 
may be different from the response to the supply of information. Second, as argued above, 
attention to a potential threat to a commodity supply or demand may be driven by factors 
unrelated to the news articles currently published such as the recollection of a hazard that 
shifted supply or demand in the past or the extrapolation from extreme phenomena that affected 
other commodities (known as the “representative heuristic” in behavioural finance).20  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
 
                                                                 
conservative relevance score of 75 but, for completeness, we also report results under the rather 
lax relevance score of 25. The news variables are summarized in Table A.6 of the online Annex. 
20
 The fact that CFEAR premium remains after controlling for the media coverage/news about 
each commodity can be taken as evidence of heuristic-driven bias and market inefficiency 
(Shefrin, 2002). Further strengthening this evidence, inspired by Vozlyublennaia (2017) we 
estimate predictive regressions of each commodity excess returns on past excess returns (up to 
four weeks) and past excess returns interacted with an aggregate attention measure ( =
∑ ∆%,∗*%4*  where  ∆%,∗ = D,R,R∆ =
 (,R/,RS/)
,R∆
 is the standardized “attention” variable associated 
with the jth hazard). The findings from these regressions (reported in Table A.7 of the online 
Annex) suggest that the fear-driven attention to hazards generally increases predictability of 
commodity futures returns which can be interpreted as a form of inefficiency. 
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5.3. Alternative portfolio construction methods 
Further we deploy alternative CFEAR portfolios: a) considering a fixed-length rolling window 
of 10 years (E = 520 weeks) for the estimation of Equation (2), b) weighting the Q1 and Q5 
constituents by the magnitude of the standardized CFEAR signal (namely, A,&, ≡ 
A, − ̅ C&, ,, where A, = >?@A, is the hazard-fear characteristic from Equation (2) 
with ̅ and C its cross-sectional mean and standard deviation at time t), c) forming the long-
short CFEAR portfolio with the entire cross section (N/2 each) of commodities weighted either 
by 1/N, standardized rankings, standardized signals, or winsorized and standardized signals, 
and d) considering at each portfolio formation time the 0.8N commodities with the largest open 
interest on the prior week to further ensure that the results are not driven by illiquidity. The 
results, gathered in the online Annex Table A.8, suggest that the CFEAR premium remains 
sizeable ranging from 4.95% p.a. (N/2 equally-weighted commodities allocated to each leg of 
the portfolio) to 10.14% p.a. (only the 80% most liquid commodities are considered). 
For completeness, in line with the pricing factor construction literature, we measure the 
premium that is captured when the long-short CFEAR portfolio is formed at each month-end 
and held for one month. We maintain all other aspects of the CFEAR portfolio construction as 
described above. We re-deploy all other portfolio strategies using the same approach. 
Reassuringly, the results in Table A.9 of the online Annex indicate that the CFEAR premium 
remains economically and statistically significant at 7.98% (U = 3.06) translating into a Sharpe 
ratio of 0.7906 that is attractive relative to the Sharpe ratio of the alternative strategies. Thus, 
we can assert that our findings do not hinge on the weekly portfolio formation frequency.  
5.4. Placebo test 
We now conduct an intuitive placebo test to ascertain whether our finding of a significant 
hazard-fear premium in commodity futures markets is an artefact of the CFEAR signal and 
factor construction methodology. For this purpose, we deploy the same methodology for cross-
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sections of financial futures contracts instead. The motivation is that, since it is most unlikely 
that fear of weather events (e.g., a frost or a tornado) or crop diseases (e.g., La Roya fungus) 
feed into the futures prices of equity index, currency and fixed income futures, an empirical 
finding of a significant hazard-fear premium also in these markets can be interpreted as 
suggestive that the commodity hazard-fear premium we have identified is spurious.21  
In order to increase the power of this placebo test, we filter out the geopolitical (GP) and 
economic (EC) hazards that might influence pricing across asset classes and obtain the CFEAR 
signal using the 123 keywords/hazards in the weather (WE) and crop disease (DI) categories 
that are most specifically associated with commodities. We re-construct the long-short CFEAR 
portfolio of commodity futures using these 123 WE/DI keywords and form similar portfolios 
with the three cross-sections of equity index, fixed income and currency futures. Specifically, 
for this analysis we obtain daily settlement prices from Thomson Reuters Datastream for 40 
equity index futures, 13 fixed income futures and 19 currency futures; see detailed composition 
in Table A.10 of the online Annex. The placebo test results are reported in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
The fear premium remains sizeable and statistically significant at 8.17% p.a. (U = 3.06) in 
commodity futures markets when the keywords are restricted to the WE and DI hazards. 
However, in sharp contrast and consistent with the above intuition, the WE and DI hazard-fear 
premia are insignificant at 1.83% p.a. (t=1.62) in equity index futures, 0.19% p.a. (t=0.25) in 
fixed income futures and 1.16% p.a. (t=1.50) in currency futures. This plausible contrast 
                                                                 
21
 We are mindful, however, of a literature that links rare disasters (including weather ones) 
and equity prices (see e.g., Barro, 2006; Hong et al., 2019, Choi et al., 2020, to name a few). 
Although rare events do impact the pricing of individual stocks (for example, a frost raises the 
valuation of producers), we expect that effect to be diversified away at the level of equity index 
futures (the same frost simultaneously decreases the valuation of refiners).  
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between commodity and financial futures suggests that the CFEAR premium uncovered in 
commodity futures markets is unlikely to be an artefact of the methodology. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Does the fear emotion influence commodities futures pricing? This paper addresses this 
question by focusing on fear about hazards such as, for instance, extreme weather, agricultural 
pests, geopolitical risks or a financial crisis, that represent threats to the commodity supply or 
demand. As in Da et al. (2011) and others, we proxy fear surges by changes in the aggregate 
Google search volume (or active attention) using 149 hazard-related keywords as query terms.  
Through time-series spanning tests, we show that a long-short portfolio that exploits the 
hazard-fear as sorting signal for a cross-section of 28 commodity futures contracts earns a 
sizeable premium of 9.28% per annum that cannot be rationalized as compensation for 
exposure to a battery of known systematic risk factors. Through asset pricing tests we 
demonstrate that exposure to hazard-fear is a key determinant of the cross-sectional variation 
in the returns of commodity portfolios beyond their exposure to systematic risk factors.  
The results reveal a link between the CFEAR premium and overall financial market 
sentiment. The short leg of the CFEAR portfolio, which drives the premium, is made up of 
commodity futures that are very sentiment-prone, and the CFEAR premium is significantly 
larger in periods of pessimism. This evidence is consistent with the wisdom from human 
psychology that investors are more vulnerable to the fear emotion when they find themselves 
outside of their “comfort zone” due to market instability or large losses. The finding of a greater 
CFEAR premium in periods of pessimism is also in line with the behavioural theory prediction 
that speculators’ fear of mounting-pessimism in the short run alongside their capital and risk 
absorption capacity constraints deter the arbitrage needed to eliminate the mispricing. 
Overall, we conclude that the presence of “animal spirits” (paraphrasing the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes) cannot be ruled out in commodity futures markets, namely, 
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fear or anxiety about potential hazards, irrespective of whether they ultimately materialize, 
feeds into futures prices and more so during periods of general financial market pessimism.   
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Appendix A. Risk factors 
The table focuses on the broad commodity market risk factor (long-only portfolio) in Panel A, and on alternative risk factors (long-short portfolios) 
in Panel B. It presents the signals used as sorting criteria for the construction of the risk factors (column 1), the criteria for allocation of commodity 
futures contracts to the long leg of the portfolio (col. 2), as well as the time window for signal measurement with reference to the portfolio formation 
time denoted t (col. 3). The right-hand section presents summary statistics for the risk factors. Mean is annualized mean excess return, StDev is 
annualized standard deviation, SR is Sharpe ratio, 1%VaR is the1% Cornish-Fisher Value-at-Risk, and MDD is the maximum drawdown. A,,/, A,,1 and A,, are the time t prices of the futures contracts with respective maturities * < + < . EA, and ℎUA, are the week t long and 
short open interest of large speculators, respectively, as reported by the CFTC. The period is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
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Table 1. Search query terms 
This table lists all the terms or keywords (J=149) used in the Google searches grouped 
according to the type of hazard or vulnerability that they represent. An asterisk indicates search 
queries carried out specifically within the weather category of Google Trends. Sources: Iizumu 
and Ramankutty (2015), Israel and Briones (2013), United Nations Office for Disaster 
Reduction (2018) and Material Risk Insights (www.materials-risks.com). 
 
 
  
Primary terms
(1) Related terms (from Google top related searches) #terms
adverse weather adverse weather conditions; adverse weather warning 3
blizzard* blizzard risk;blizzard warning; weather blizzard warning 4
catastrophic weather catastrophic events;catastrophic weather events; natural disaster: natural hazard 5
climate disturbance climate change; cyclogenesis; global warming 4
cold* cold spell;cold weather; freeze warning 4
cyclone cyclone risk;cyclone warning; tropical cyclone; tropical cyclone risk; tropical cyclone warning; 6
drought drought risk, drought warning, droughts 4
dry weather 1
El niño weather 1
extreme weather extreme cold;extreme cold temperatures; extreme heat; extreme rain; extreme temperatures;extreme w 7
forest fire forest fires 2
flood flood risk; flood warning; flooding; floods 5
frost* frost risk; frost warning;frosts* 4
gust* gusts* 2
hail hail damage; hail risk; hail storm warning; hail storm; hail warning 6
Harmattan wind 1
heat* heat wave; heat waves; heatwave; heatwaves 5
hot weather high temperature; high temperatures 3
hurricane hurricane risk; hurricane warning; hurricanes* 4
rain* torrential rain; heavy rain*; heavy rain risk; heavy rain warning ; heavy rain fall 6
severe weather severe heat; severe weather risk; weather risk; weather warning 5
snow* snow risk; snow storm warning; snow warning 4
storm* storm risk; storm warning; tropical storm; tropical storm risk; tropical storm warning 6
tornado tornado risk ; tornado warning 3
tropical weather 1
typhoon typhoon risk; typhoon warning 3
wet weather 1
wildfire* wildfire risk; wildfire warning; wildfires 4
wind* wind gust; wind gusts; wind risk; wind warning; wind speed; wind storm; strong wind; strong wind gust 9
crop pest crop diseases; crop pest risk; crop pests;insect pest; pest control; pest risk 7
Ebola 1
La Roya 1
rust coffee 1
Middle East conflict Middle East instability, Middle East terrorism 3
oil embargo oil crisis, oil outage 3
Russian crisis 1
Libyan crisis 1
Syrian war 1
terrorism Africa terrorism; Africa instability 3
terrorist attack terrorist attacks 2
crisis economic crisis; financial crisis 3
recession economic recession; recession 2008; recession depression; the recession; US recession 6
unemployment unemployment rate; US unemployment 3
149
Weather (WE; 113 keywords)
Agricultural diseases (DI; 10 keywords)
Geopolitical  (GP; 14 keywords)
Economic  (EC; 12 keywords)
Total 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for individual commodity futures 
This table lists for the 28 commodities the sub-sector, the first and last observation dates, 
annualized mean excess return (Mean), annualized standard deviation (StDev), first-order 
autocorrelation (AC1), and Ljung-Box test statistic (LB4; H0: first four autocorrelations are 
jointly zero) for the weekly excess returns, as well as the mean and standard deviation of the 
CFEAR characteristics. *, **, *** is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  
Mean StDev AC1 LB4 Mean StDev
I. Agricultural sector (N=17)
Corn Cereal grains 20040105 20181231 -0.0671 0.2912 -0.0021 1.6121 -0.0349 0.0280
Oats Cereal grains 20040105 20181231 0.0120 0.3475 -0.0339 7.8781 * -0.0242 0.0295
Rough rice Cereal grains 20040105 20181231 -0.0819 0.2488 0.0101 2.8643 -0.0208 0.0464
Wheat CBT Cereal grains 20040105 20181231 -0.1227 0.3152 0.0129 0.6250 -0.0684 0.0329
Cotton no.2 Oilseeds 20040105 20181231 -0.0220 0.2872 0.0085 1.7628 0.0242 0.0379
Soybeans Oilseeds 20040105 20181231 0.0525 0.2486 0.0256 0.9043 -0.0265 0.0217
Soybean meal Oilseeds 20040105 20181231 0.1092 0.2872 0.0462 2.8353 -0.0653 0.0315
Soybean oil Oilseeds 20040105 20181231 -0.0467 0.2460 -0.0176 2.3459 0.0498 0.0152
Feeder cattle Meats 20040105 20181231 0.0270 0.1659 -0.0479 4.9823 0.0015 0.0220
Lean hogs Meats 20040105 20150706 -0.0662 0.2377 0.0650 9.1910 0.0643 0.0261
Live cattle Meats 20040105 20181231 -0.0075 0.1602 -0.0618 30.2330 *** -0.0456 0.0119
Frozen pork bellies Meats 20040105 20110705 -0.0228 0.2979 -0.0570 8.5047 -0.0660 0.0288
Cocoa Misc. other softs 20040105 20181231 0.0253 0.2948 -0.0237 6.3451 -0.0797 0.0518
Coffee C Misc. other softs 20040105 20181231 -0.0551 0.3115 0.0115 3.3936 -0.0752 0.0526
Frozen Orange juice Misc. other softs 20040105 20181231 0.0176 0.3414 0.0344 10.0380 ** -0.0406 0.0503
Sugar no.11 Misc. other softs 20040105 20181231 -0.0417 0.3141 -0.0351 9.9182 ** -0.0284 0.0310
Lumber Misc. other softs 20040105 20181231 -0.1229 0.3087 0.0074 3.6826 0.0209 0.0426
II. Energy sector (N=6)
Light crude oil Energy 20040105 20181231 -0.0753 0.3400 -0.0200 6.6687 -0.0007 0.0415
Electricity JPM Energy 20040105 20150727 -0.1454 0.4428 0.0619 8.0159 * 0.0650 0.0732
Gasoline RBOB Energy 20051010 20181231 -0.0305 0.3227 0.0404 14.1450 ** 0.2356 0.3163
Heating oil Energy 20040105 20181231 -0.0125 0.3095 0.0227 1.9867 -0.0179 0.0592
Natural gas Energy 20040105 20181231 -0.3633 0.4224 -0.0102 3.7559 0.0626 0.0527
NY unleaded gas Energy 20040105 20070102 0.1768 0.3686 -0.0146 1.9555 0.0533 0.0391
III. Metals (N=5)
Copper (High Grade) Base metals 20040105 20181231 0.0682 0.2720 0.0188 9.1223 * -0.0191 0.0151
Gold 100oz (CMX) Precious metals 20040105 20181231 0.0560 0.1785 -0.0090 3.1216 -0.0103 0.0362
Palladium Precious metals 20040105 20181231 0.0988 0.3148 0.0220 0.7724 -0.0298 0.0553
Platinum Precious metals 20040105 20181231 -0.0114 0.2302 0.0167 4.2287 -0.0258 0.0154
Silver 5000 oz Precious metals 20040105 20181231 0.0421 0.3196 0.0117 2.2893 -0.0599 0.0638
CFEARExcess return 
Commodity Sub-sector
First obs 
YYYYMMDD
Last obs 
YYYYMMDD
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for CFEAR-sorted portfolios 
The table summarizes the performance of the CFEAR quintiles and that of the long-short 
CFEAR portfolio. Q1 (Q5) is the quintile of commodities with the most negative (positive) 
CFEAR characteristic. Newey-West robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses for the mean. 
CER denotes certainty equivalent return based on power utility. The time period is January 
2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
  
Long 
(Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4
Short 
(Q5) Q1-Q5
Mean 0.0435 -0.0210 -0.0125 -0.0391 -0.1421 0.0928
(0.96) (-0.46) (-0.23) (-0.87) (-2.59) (3.35)
StDev 0.1758 0.1658 0.1807 0.1615 0.1882 0.1030
Downside volatility (0%) 0.1141 0.1181 0.1267 0.1061 0.1305 0.0649
Skewness -0.1094 -0.4580 -0.3327 -0.1203 -0.1210 -0.1307
(-1.21) (-5.06) (-3.67) (-1.33) (-1.34) (-1.44)
Excess Kurtosis 0.8700 1.9297 1.7840 0.7046 1.6227 0.4012
(4.80) (10.65) (9.85) (3.89) (8.96) (2.21)
JB normality test p -value 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0019 0.0010 0.0320
AC1 0.0097 0.0440 0.0311 0.0066 0.0437 0.0035
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0627 0.0702 0.0741 0.0584 0.0755 0.0341
% of positive months 54% 50% 50% 49% 47% 57%
Maximum drawdown -0.4018 -0.5381 -0.6102 -0.6140 -0.8878 -0.1881
Sharpe ratio 0.2475 -0.1268 -0.0694 -0.2423 -0.7551 0.9012
Sortino ratio 0.3811 -0.1780 -0.0990 -0.3685 -1.0886 1.4299
Omega ratio 1.0926 0.9549 0.9748 0.9163 0.7579 1.3770
CER (power utility) -0.0344 -0.0919 -0.0964 -0.1054 -0.2346 0.0660
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Table 4. Time-series spanning tests  
The table reports estimation results from time-series regressions of the excess returns of the 
long-short CFEAR portfolio onto various systematic risk factors. The base model is the 
commodity pricing model of Bakshi et al. (2019) which we augment with one additional risk 
factor at a time, and with all risk factors. Alongside the annualized alpha, we report the betas 
(risk exposures) with Newey West h.a.c. t-statistics in parentheses and the adjusted-R2 of the 
regressions. The time period is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
 
 
 
 
Annualized alpha 0.0943 0.0947 0.0881 0.0898 0.0933 0.0912 0.0891 0.0932 0.0823
(3.69) (3.73) (3.48) (3.48) (3.63) (3.59) (3.35) (3.92) (3.35)
AVG -0.0110 -0.0104 -0.0129 -0.0132 0.0417 0.0426 -0.0068 0.0001 0.0249
(-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.37) (-0.37) (1.04) (1.08) (-0.19) (0.00) (0.65)
Basis -0.1730 -0.1715 -0.2341 -0.1928 -0.1639 -0.1776 -0.1873 -0.1245 -0.2023
(-2.89) (-2.82) (-3.97) (-3.26) (-2.82) (-3.04) (-3.20) (-2.31) (-3.82)
Momentum 0.2756 0.2778 0.2951 0.2726 0.2568 0.2674 0.2435 0.2190 0.2253
(6.12) (5.60) (6.43) (5.87) (5.80) (6.25) (5.60) (5.19) (5.02)
Hedging pressure -0.0094 0.1218 -0.3077 -0.0217
(-0.17) 2.0390 -6.9259 (-0.46)
Convexity 0.1640 0.1504
(2.99) (3.09)
Skewness 0.1157 0.0761
(2.24) (1.55)
VaR1 -0.1167 -0.0175
(-2.01) (-0.25)
VaR99 0.1330 0.0445
(2.58) (0.65)
Basis-momentum 0.1218 0.0583
(2.04) (1.09)
Liquidity -0.3077 -0.2741
(-6.93) (-6.37)
Adj.-R² (%) 8.48 8.37 10.28 9.56 9.50 10.04 9.48 16.23 18.54
Base model
Fundamental risk factors Tail risk factors
Liquidity and volatility 
risk factors
Base model augmented with All risk 
factors
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Table 5. Cross-sectional pricing tests  
The table reports the (annualized) prices of risk from cross-sectional regressions of average 
portfolio excess returns on full-sample betas with Shanken (1992) errors-in-variables corrected 
t-statistics in parentheses, and Kan et al. (2013) t-statistics additionally corrected for model 
misspecification in curly brackets. The base model is the commodity pricing model of Bakshi et 
al. (2019) which we augment with one additional risk factor at a time, and with all risk factors.  
The 56 test assets are the quintiles based on the CFEAR signal, alternative 9 signals listed in 
Appendix A, Panel B, and equally-weighted and weekly-rebalanced portfolios of commodities 
in all 6 sectors. The two last rows report the adjusted-R² and MAPE (mean absolute pricing error) 
of each model. The time period is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
 
 
 
CFEAR
Constant -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0014
(-0.86) (-0.24) (-0.83) (-0.06) (-0.63) (-0.15) (-0.77) (-0.46) (-0.93) (-2.13) (-1.63) (-1.93) (-1.63) (-0.69) (-0.99) (-0.47) (-0.83) (-1.26) (-1.29)
{-0.83} {-0.24} {-0.88} {-0.06} {-0.70} {-0.15} {-0.80} {-0.49} {-1.04} {-1.78} {-1.46} {-1.60} {-1.47} {-0.70} {-1.06} {-0.52} {-0.89} {-1.04} {-1.17}
CFEAR 0.0894 0.0928 0.0916 0.0913 0.0889 0.0808 0.0814 0.0868 0.0901 0.0800
(2.56) (2.79) (2.75) (2.75) (2.69) (2.58) (2.54) (2.68) (2.92) (2.65)
{2.48} {2.72} {2.68} {2.74} {2.63} {2.54} {2.58} {2.61} {3.09} {2.69}
AVG -0.0224 0.0022 -0.0299 -0.0056 -0.0260 -0.0001 -0.0131 0.0065 0.0918 0.0613 0.0712 0.0557 -0.0040 0.0087 -0.0129 0.0023 0.0394 0.0415
(-0.40) (0.04) (-0.53) (-0.10) (-0.47) (-0.00) (-0.24) (0.12) (1.34) (0.90) (1.11) (0.86) (-0.07) (0.16) (-0.23) (0.04) (0.59) (0.62)
{-0.37} {0.04} {-0.48} {-0.10} {-0.43} {-0.00} {-0.21} {0.12} {1.01} {0.77} {0.85} {0.73} {-0.07} {0.16} {-0.24} {0.04} {0.43} {0.49}
Basis 0.0502 0.0745 0.0406 0.0643 0.0417 0.0708 0.0361 0.0621 0.0581 0.0751 0.0479 0.0691 0.0502 0.0723 0.0653 0.0753 0.0340 0.0490
(1.58) (2.44) (1.32) (2.18) (1.28) (2.31) (1.15) (2.12) (1.84) (2.46) (1.50) (2.29) (1.58) (2.36) (2.12) (2.46) (1.17) (1.73)
{1.63} {2.72} {1.33} {2.41} {1.36} {2.63} {1.14} {2.24} {1.87} {2.64} {1.44} {2.43} {1.65} {2.62} {2.16} {2.74} {1.19} {1.85}
Momentum 0.0846 0.0454 0.0703 0.0288 0.0822 0.0470 0.0668 0.0364 0.0575 0.0366 0.0562 0.0344 0.0650 0.0396 0.0586 0.0439 0.0327 0.0205
(2.21) (1.29) (1.94) (0.88) (2.16) (1.33) (1.87) (1.08) (1.65) (1.07) (1.64) (1.03) (1.78) (1.13) (1.71) (1.28) (1.01) (0.64)
{2.20} {1.37} {1.84} {0.93} {2.19} {1.41} {1.88} {1.19} {1.62} {1.16} {1.67} {1.14} {1.80} {1.22} {1.72} {1.37} {1.09} {0.71}
Hedging pressure 0.0616 0.0607 0.0485 0.0536
(1.87) (1.84) (1.61) (1.78)
{1.71} {1.77} {1.56} {1.75}
Convexity 0.0647 0.0478 0.0589 0.0503
(2.45) (1.87) (2.29) (1.97)
{2.27} {1.89} {2.19} {1.90}
Skewness 0.0707 0.0662 0.0557 0.0559
(2.15) (2.01) (1.88) (1.89)
{1.87} {1.88} {1.83} {1.90}
VaR1 -0.0517 -0.0295 -0.0382 -0.0276
(-1.53) (-0.90) (-1.20) (-0.88)
{-1.47} {-0.92} {-1.26} {-0.94}
VaR99 0.0570 0.0424 0.0321 0.0265
(1.72) (1.29) (1.00) (0.83)
{1.69} {1.32} {0.97} {0.84}
Basis-momentum 0.0866 0.0572 0.0634 0.0547
(2.81) (2.06) (2.34) (2.05)
{2.57} {1.85} {2.19} {1.96}
Liquidity -0.0573 -0.0282 -0.0263 -0.0090
(-1.81) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.32)
{-1.53} {-0.82} {-0.75} {-0.28}
Adj.-R² (%) 41.01 32.42 62.58 37.74 69.09 40.64 63.07 44.89 68.65 48.43 66.71 49.89 68.36 42.36 64.56 44.54 62.72 65.90 77.19
MAPE (%) 0.048 0.049 0.039 0.048 0.035 0.047 0.039 0.045 0.035 0.045 0.038 0.044 0.037 0.047 0.038 0.046 0.039 0.036 0.03
All risk factorsBase model
Liquidity and volatility risk factorsFundamental risk factors Tail risk factors
Base model augmented with 
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Table 6. Properties of CFEAR commodity quintiles 
The table summarizes the properties of CFEAR-based commodity quintiles. Q1 is the quintile 
of commodities with the lowest CFEAR characteristics and Q5 is the quintile of commodities 
with the highest CFEAR characteristics. The characteristics other than CFEAR are measured 
over their relevant windows as listed in Appendix A and are subsequently averaged across 
constituents and over time. Realized variance is the average squared daily return over the 22 
days preceding portfolio formation time. Dollar open interest is the product of the number of 
outstanding contracts, contract size and front-end futures settlement price (/10^10). The 
momentum, basis-momentum and variance characteristics are annualized. The last column 
shows Newey-West t-statistics for the null hypothesis of no difference in a given characteristic 
across the Q1 and Q5 quintiles. The sampling period is January 2005 to December 2018.  
 
Long 
(Q1) Q2 Q3 Q4
Short 
(Q5) Q1-Q5
CFEAR -0.0807 -0.0459 -0.0243 0.0071 0.0962 -0.1770
(-17.80) (-14.67) (-12.62) (6.76) (16.59) (-19.94)
Basis -0.0076 -0.0088 -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0131 0.0055
(-6.06) (-9.76) (-7.76) (-8.75) (-5.21) (2.02)
Momentum 0.0228 0.0130 -0.0040 -0.0427 -0.1160 0.1387
(1.34) (0.92) (-0.18) (-2.50) (-4.92) (8.10)
Hedging pressure 0.2842 0.3454 0.2952 0.2552 0.2254 0.0588
(29.19) (31.00) (19.00) (23.08) (23.81) (4.16)
Convexity (x1,000) 0.0482 -0.0354 -0.0343 -0.0790 -0.1154 0.1636
(1.22) (-1.32) (-1.75) (-3.38) (-1.22) (1.50)
Skewness -0.0341 0.0965 0.1045 0.1509 -0.0158 -0.0183
(-1.31) (3.30) (5.07) (6.32) (-0.78) (-0.69)
VaR1 -0.0465 -0.0442 -0.0459 -0.0420 -0.0485 0.0020
(-51.67) (-47.18) (-42.96) (-45.19) (-47.46) (1.66)
VaR99 0.0456 0.0411 0.0420 0.0402 0.0474 -0.0018
(74.07) (55.81) (51.66) (43.90) (50.64) (-1.93)
Basis-momentum 0.0143 -0.0017 -0.0089 -0.0176 -0.0073 0.0216
(3.50) (-0.61) (-2.71) (-9.53) (-1.85) (4.14)
Liquidity 4.01 1.28 1.90 1.79 53.10 -49.09
(3.78) (3.97) (3.23) (4.36) (5.04) (-4.59)
Realized variance 0.0505 0.0245 0.0299 0.0260 0.1992 -0.1487
(3.87) (5.51) (4.98) (7.54) (6.83) (-5.03)
Dollar open interest 57.49 65.00 83.56 22.91 23.97 33.53
(23.19) (13.39) (19.22) (14.03) (19.49) (11.42)
CFEAR
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Table 7. CFEAR effect over time 
This table reports in Panel A (Panel B) the annualized mean excess return and annualized alpha 
from Bakshi et al. (2019) benchmark model for the long, short and long-short (LS) CFEAR 
portfolios in high vs. low VIX states (Panel A) and high vs. low TED states (Panel B) using 
the full sample average as cut-point. The last row of each panel presents t-statistics for the 
significance of differences between the high and low regimes. Panel C presents summary 
statistics for the long-short CFEAR portfolios formed at the end of each week day (Monday to 
Friday). Newey-West robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The time period is January 
2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
Panel A: CFEAR in high and low VIX states 
 
 
 
Panel B: CFEAR in high and low TED states 
 
 
 
Panel C: CFEAR portfolio performance and choice of portfolio formation day 
 
 
Long Short LS Long Short LS
  I.  High VIX 0.0635 -0.3068 0.1852 0.1030 -0.2800 0.1916
(0.65) (-2.82) (3.92) (1.82) (-4.60) (4.44)
  II. Low VIX 0.0341 -0.0526 0.0433 0.0662 -0.0190 0.0426
(0.71) (-0.94) (1.32) (1.80) (-0.48) (1.39)
  t -stat (H0: diff=0) 0.27 -2.10 2.48 0.54 -3.60 2.83
Mean excess return Alpha 
Long Short LS Long Short LS
  I.  High TED 0.0539 -0.2199 0.1369 0.1104 -0.1605 0.1355
(0.52) (-1.78) (2.25) (1.59) (-2.21) (2.32)
  II. Low TED 0.0408 -0.1124 0.0766 0.0675 -0.0916 0.0796
(0.86) (-1.90) (2.58) (2.06) (-2.35) (2.97)
  t -stat (H0: diff=0) 0.12 -0.78 0.90 0.57 -0.83 0.88
Mean excess return Alpha 
Long Short LS Long Short LS
Mean 0.0435 -0.1421 0.0928 0.0868 0.0649 0.0623 -0.0162 -0.0996 0.0417
(0.96) (-2.59) (3.35) (3.03) (2.35) (2.38) (-0.38) (-1.66) (1.41)
StDev 0.1758 0.1882 0.1030 0.1037 0.1115 0.1041 0.1477 0.2282 0.1160
Downside volatility (0%) 0.1141 0.1305 0.0649 0.0616 0.0686 0.0628 0.1110 0.1607 0.0788
Skewness -0.1094 -0.1210 -0.1307 -0.0581 0.1036 -0.0066 -0.6790 0.0782 -0.3250
(-1.21) (-1.34) (-1.44) (-0.64) (1.14) (-0.07) (-7.49) (0.86) (-3.58)
Excess Kurtosis 0.8700 1.6227 0.4012 -0.0926 0.6568 0.3547 3.2189 3.8769 3.2562
(4.80) (8.96) (2.21) (-0.51) (3.62) (1.96) (17.75) (21.38) (17.96)
JB normality test p -value 0.0010 0.0010 0.0320 0.5000 0.0034 0.1334 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0627 0.0755 0.0341 0.0321 0.0359 0.0336 0.0701 0.1023 0.0521
% of positive months 54% 47% 57% 54.2% 53% 54% 51% 47% 53%
Maximum drawdown -0.4018 -0.8878 -0.1881 -0.1704 -0.1530 -0.1710 -0.5354 -0.8406 -0.2467
Sharpe ratio 0.2475 -0.7551 0.9012 0.8373 0.5816 0.5984 -0.1095 -0.4365 0.3598
Sortino ratio 0.3811 -1.0886 1.4299 1.4093 0.9453 0.9909 -0.1457 -0.6198 0.5293
Omega ratio 1.0926 0.7579 1.3770 1.3372 1.2334 1.2336 0.9599 0.8470 1.1408
CER (power utility) -0.0344 -0.2346 0.0660 0.0598 0.0338 0.0352 -0.0729 -0.2339 0.0077
Monday-end
Tue-end
Wed-
end
Thu-end
Friday-end
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Table 8. Alternative CFEAR signal construction methods  
The table summarizes the long-short CFEAR portfolio under different signal construction methods.: (1) using US searches from Google Trends; 
(2) winsorizing the hazard-attention variable ∆%,∗ ; (3) deseasonalizing the hazard-attention variable; (4) accounting for different treatments of the 
zeros in ∆%,∗  by replacing them by ones in (4a), by using ∆%, = ln O *,R*,RS/T instead of ∆%, = ln O
,R
,RS/T in (4b) or by removing the zeros in (4c); 
(5) excluding noisy keywords with a percentage of zeros () of at least 20% or for which the average correlation amongst the six series {(%,}. that 
form (%, on six different days d is less than =80%; (6) considering six alternative search dates (12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th and 20th December 2019); 
(7) controling for media coverage under relevance scores 75 and 25. The time period is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
(4a) (4b) (4c) Relevance 75 Relevance 25
Mean 0.0738 0.0795 0.0606 0.0742 0.0813 0.0827 0.0959 0.0686 0.0835 0.0891
(2.97) (2.96) (2.50) (2.86) (3.19) (3.06) (3.24) (2.49) (3.19) (3.25)
StDev 0.0916 0.1034 0.0982 0.0960 0.0947 0.0993 0.1100 0.1101 0.0989 0.0993
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0570 0.0656 0.0616 0.0599 0.0580 0.0624 0.0686 0.0713 0.0596 0.0625
Skewness 0.0189 -0.0990 -0.0889 0.0262 0.0506 -0.0620 -0.1288 -0.0985 0.0164 -0.0685
(0.21) (-1.09) (-0.98) (0.29) (0.56) (-0.68) (-1.42) (-1.09) (0.18) (-0.76)
Excess Kurtosis 0.5735 0.6454 0.4069 0.5727 0.5459 0.7693 0.6672 0.8922 0.3767 0.3967
(3.16) (3.56) (2.25) (3.16) (3.01) (4.25) (3.68) (4.92) (2.08) (2.19)
JB normality test p -value 0.0110 0.0038 0.0478 0.0109 0.0136 0.0014 0.0025 0.0010 0.1027 0.0638
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0297 0.0350 0.0327 0.0311 0.0302 0.0335 0.0374 0.0384 0.0314 0.0323
% of positive months 56% 57% 55% 55.8% 56.2% 54% 54% 55% 55% 56%
Maximum drawdown -0.1537 -0.1432 -0.1635 -0.1574 -0.1317 -0.1829 -0.1534 -0.1891 -0.1336 -0.1263
Sharpe ratio 0.8058 0.7695 0.6175 0.7732 0.8589 0.8329 0.8717 0.6232 0.8435 0.8973
Sortino ratio 1.2948 1.2129 0.9841 1.2387 1.4013 1.3255 1.3973 0.9617 1.4003 1.4269
Omega ratio 1.3389 1.3167 1.2450 1.3219 1.3612 1.3510 1.3606 1.2540 1.3495 1.3782
CER (power utility) 0.0528 0.0527 0.0364 0.0511 0.0588 0.0579 0.0654 0.0382 0.0589 0.0643
(4)
Media coverage
GSVI series 
obtained 12
th 
to 
20
th
 Dec 2019
US searches
Winsorized 
searches
Deseasonal. 
searches
0 searches filtering
(7)
Excluding noisy 
keywords (τ=20%, 
κ=80%)
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Table 9. Placebo test 
The table reports summary statistics for the long-short hazard-fear portfolios based on the 123 
query terms confined to the weather (WE) and agricultural disease (DI) categories. The cross 
sections are as detailed in Table 2 (28 commodity futures) and in the online Annex Table A.10 
(40 equity index futures, 13 fixed income futures, 19 currency futures). The weekly portfolio 
returns cover the time period from January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
 
 
 
Commodity Equity index Fixed income Currency
Mean 0.0817 0.0183 0.0019 0.0116
(3.06) (1.62) (0.25) (1.50)
StDev 0.1017 0.0473 0.0277 0.0321
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0643 0.0332 0.0187 0.0212
Skewness -0.0691 -0.0971 0.0454 0.1272
(-0.76) (-1.07) (0.50) (1.40)
Excess Kurtosis 0.6688 3.7939 2.9409 2.5147
(3.69) (20.94) (16.23) (13.88)
JB normality test p -value 0.0035 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0341 0.0212 0.0114 0.0123
% of positive months 56% 53% 50% 52%
Maximum drawdown -0.1626 -0.1151 -0.0627 -0.0613
Sharpe ratio 0.8034 0.3864 0.0674 0.3619
Sortino ratio 1.2711 0.5507 0.0998 0.5487
Omega ratio 1.3352 1.1585 1.0261 1.1446
CER (power utility) 0.0557 0.0127 0.0000 0.0090
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Figure 1. Google searches and commodity prices 
The graphs plots the evolution of monthly search intensity or attention to hurricane, ebola, oil crisis and unemployment hazards as captured by 
the Google Search Volume Index (GSVI; denoted sj,t in the paper), alongside the monthly average of the daily commodity futures price.  
 
Panel A: hurricane (WE) searches vs lumber price    Panel B: ebola (DI) searches vs feeder/live cattle prices 
    
Panel C: oil crisis (GP) searches vs light crude oil price   Panel D: unemployment (EC) searches vs natural gas price 
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Figure 2. Constituents of long and short legs of the CFEAR portfolio 
The graph plots the percentage of sample weeks from January 2005 (week 1) to December 
2018 (week 4) that allocate each of the N=28 commodities to the top quintile (Q5) or bottom 
quintile (Q1) according to the CFEAR signal. The results are organized by sector.  
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Figure 3. Future value of $1 invested in long-short and long-only commodity portfolios 
The graph shows the evolution of $1 invested in the long-short portfolios based on the CFEAR 
signal (dark black line), on the alternative signals listed in Appendix A, alongside the evolution 
of $1 invested in a long-only portfolio that equally weights all commodities, AVG. The 
portfolio rebalancing frequency is weekly. Total returns (excess plus risk free rate) are plotted. 
 
  
49 
 
Figure 4. Turnover and net performance of commodity portfolios  
Panel A plots the turnover of each of the long-short portfolios formed according to the CFEAR 
signals and alternative signals listed in Appendix A. Panel B plots the Sharpe ratios of each of 
the portfolios before and after proportional trading costs (TC) of 8.6 bps (Marshall et al., 2012).  
 
Panel A: Turnover 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sharpe ratio 
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Table A.1 Summary of Google search volume indices (GSVIs) 
Each of the series summarized in this table is an average of the six weekly GSVI series per keyword 
5 = 1, … ,149 obtained on six different dates (denoted (%, in the paper) from Google Trends. AC1 is the 
first-order autocorrelation, LB4 is the Ljung-Box test statistic (H0: first four autocorrelations 
are jointly zero), ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic (H0: unit root non-
stationary). The observation period is January 2004 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).    
 
Mean Median St.Dev Min Max % zeros AC1 LB4 ADF 
Weather (WE; 113 keywords)
1 adverse weather 8.62 5.00 10.37 0.00 100.00 4.34% 0.346 243.14 *** -13.040 ***
2 adverse weather conditions 7.54 5.33 10.24 0.00 100.00 20.05% 0.337 146.39 *** -19.850 ***
3 adverse weather warning 1.88 0.00 7.79 0.00 90.33 89.14% 0.124 23.48 *** -16.700 ***
4 blizzard 6.05 3.50 8.6 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.434 325.75 *** -7.500 ***
5 blizzard risk 9.88 0.00 13.56 0.00 79.67 51.09% 0.271 138.34 *** -3.810 ***
6 blizzard warning 4.1 0.83 10.07 0.00 100.00 26.95% 0.198 54.04 *** -15.930 ***
7 catastrophic events 29.24 25.83 18.56 0.00 99.50 3.96% 0.693 1157.22 *** -6.170 ***
8 catastrophic weather 15.14 13.33 14.77 0.00 99.17 27.59% 0.277 189.53 *** -10.880 ***
9 catastrophic weather events 8.6 0.00 12.55 0.00 69.05 57.09% 0.270 166.41 *** -7.980 ***
10 climate change 36.15 32.83 14.32 9.17 100.00 0.00% 0.864 1677.29 *** -5.490 ***
11 climate disturbance 12.76 9.00 13.97 0.00 82.83 38.95% 0.366 371.43 *** -7.370 ***
12 cold 23.43 20.33 12.35 8.50 100.00 0.00% 0.688 978.29 *** -7.820 ***
13 cold spell 16.08 13.50 12.12 0.00 100.00 6.64% 0.543 703.55 *** -6.740 ***
14 cold weather 17.55 11.83 14.93 4.33 100.00 0.00% 0.792 1372.27 *** -6.950 ***
15 cyclogenesis 12.52 8.67 12.12 0.00 100.00 9.71% 0.334 271.21 *** -5.965 ***
16 cyclone 9.37 7.67 8.93 3.17 100.00 0.00% 0.311 142.65 *** -14.748 ***
17 cyclone risk 12.01 10.17 12.19 0.00 94.00 24.78% 0.299 186.67 *** -7.731 ***
18 cyclone warning 6.36 3.00 10.25 0.00 100.00 5.11% 0.277 102.55 *** -12.072 ***
19 drought 33.64 30.50 13.42 8.33 100.00 0.00% 0.890 1912.54 *** -6.695 ***
20 drought risk 19.82 18.17 16.2 0.00 81.33 17.24% 0.506 749.60 *** -3.913 ***
21 drought warning 15.52 13.33 14.35 0.00 77.67 26.05% 0.264 193.68 *** -9.021 ***
22 droughts 34.49 30.83 16.93 6.67 100.00 0.00% 0.835 1698.90 *** -6.473 ***
23 dry weather 51.08 50.60 13.95 0.00 100.00 0.13% 0.697 1381.49 *** -4.162 ***
24 el niño weather 14.36 12.00 14.09 0.00 99.00 23.50% 0.526 759.32 *** -5.038 ***
25 extreme cold 15.58 12.17 12.32 0.00 100.00 0.13% 0.700 1048.59 *** -7.636 ***
26 extreme cold temperatures 10.72 8.67 11.65 0.00 100.00 22.99% 0.434 350.43 *** -10.477 ***
27 extreme heat 20.24 17.5 11.43 2.33 100.00 0.00% 0.556 529.87 *** -9.870 ***
28 extreme rain 36.55 38.33 18.03 0.00 95.00 2.17% 0.618 1187.79 *** -2.876 **
29 extreme temperatures 20.25 19.33 10.63 0.00 100.00 2.17% 0.401 345.35 *** -8.749 ***
30 extreme weather 33.58 31.67 13.88 12.67 100.00 0.00% 0.733 1351.06 *** -4.264 ***
31 extreme wind 29.99 28.83 14.62 0.00 100.00 1.53% 0.546 900.89 *** -4.740 ***
32 flood 18.79 15.00 10.67 6.67 100.00 0.00% 0.647 863.55 *** -6.681 ***
33 flood risk 18.02 17.67 8.68 0.00 100.00 0.13% 0.389 241.14 *** -9.074 ***
34 flood warning 7.83 4.33 10.76 0.00 100.00 0.38% 0.378 199.40 *** -9.316 ***
35 flooding 11.13 8.33 12.77 1.33 100.00 0.00% 0.386 164.14 *** -18.565 ***
36 floods 9.16 7.83 9.81 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.501 428.60 *** -7.950 ***
37 forest fire 19.91 15.83 16.02 2.83 100.00 0.00% 0.790 1567.43 *** -5.794 ***
38 forest fires 15.62 10.67 15.02 1.33 100.00 0.00% 0.634 806.28 *** -9.430 ***
39 freeze warning 10.88 6.17 13.57 0.00 98.67 14.43% 0.229 127.47 *** -11.446 ***
40 frost 35.62 34.00 12.78 3.00 100.00 0.00% 0.630 972.80 *** -7.183 ***
41 frost risk 16.53 14.17 14.58 0.00 91.67 17.11% 0.469 455.58 *** -8.924 ***
42 frost warning 10.48 7.17 12.03 0.00 100.00 13.67% 0.353 153.50 *** -11.890 ***
43 frosts 7.49 0.00 12.25 0.00 67.00 62.45% 0.194 62.23 *** -22.950 ***
44 global warming 43.02 39.00 18.91 10.83 100.00 0.00% 0.920 2189.03 *** -4.227 ***
45 gust 10.68 8.83 10.21 0.00 100.00 11.24% 0.098 11,80** *** -25.311 ***
46 gusts 8.81 7.33 8.96 0.00 100.00 16.60% 0.135 17.72 *** -24.358 ***
47 hail 49.68 45 15.60 28.50 100.00 0.00% 0.855 2101.77 *** -3.437 ***
48 hail damage 24.83 21.17 15.61 0.00 100.00 0.26% 0.662 1009.20 *** -8.761 ***
49 hail risk 10.56 4.83 13.65 0.00 66.50 45.98% 0.342 332.51 *** -3.763 ***
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(cont.) Table A.1 Summary of Google search volume indices (GSVIs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median St.Dev Min Max % zeros AC1 LB4 ADF 
Weather (WE; 113 keywords)
50 hail storm 17.68 15.17 11.70 2.33 100.00 0.00% 0.383 275.50 *** -10.497 ***
51 hail storm warning 4.44 0 8.87 0.00 100.00 50.83% 0.045 33.51 *** -12.638 ***
52 hail warning 8.97 7.5 9.70 0.00 100.00 23.75% 0.113 32.19 *** -24.845 ***
53 harmattan wind 13.02 9 14.75 0.00 91.33 39.46% 0.277 191.05 *** -4.139 ***
54 heat 10.91 6.83 12.94 1.33 100.00 0.00% 0.743 1217.86 *** -7.904 ***
55 heat wave 15.12 12.5 9.83 5.50 100.00 0.00% 0.667 894.82 *** -8.037 ***
56 heat waves 18.84 17.17 11.71 0.00 96.50 0.26% 0.275 159.64 *** -8.153 ***
57 heatwave 12.97 10.17 10.60 4.00 100.00 0.00% 0.579 483.67 *** -14.416 ***
58 heatwaves 40.52 41.33 16.71 0.00 100.00 3.83% 0.736 1512.80 *** -4.603 ***
59 heavy rain 11.58 9.17 10.33 0.00 100.00 5.24% 0.458 448.48 *** -11.105 ***
60 heavy rain fall 19.16 19.00 15.53 0.00 94.00 23.63% 0.497 703.05 *** -5.221 ***
61 heavy rain risk 7.37 0.00 13.89 0.00 72.67 69.86% 0.161 114.41 *** -6.815 ***
62 heavy rain warning 11.44 4.83 15.01 0.00 94.00 48.28% 0.312 272.57 *** -6.106 ***
63 high temperature 66.09 67.17 11.85 31.00 100.00 0.00% 0.840 1923.07 *** -3.666 ***
64 high temperatures 45.55 44.00 14.33 13.00 100.00 0.00% 0.688 1011.00 *** -5.155 ***
65 hot weather 25.77 23.17 10.88 10.17 100.00 0.00% 0.747 1212.33 *** -7.233 ***
66 hurricane 4.44 2.00 10.97 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.556 427.86 *** -14.905 ***
67 hurricane risk 6.14 3.83 9.14 0.00 100.00 5.49% 0.437 316.72 *** -12.428 ***
68 hurricane warning 4.61 2.00 9.92 0.00 100.00 0.77% 0.425 269.08 *** -10.873 ***
69 hurricanes 10.88 7.50 12.16 1.17 100.00 0.00% 0.644 790.92 *** -9.473 ***
70 natural disaster 25.52 28.67 14.87 3.00 100.00 0.00% 0.895 2063.86 *** -4.452 ***
71 natural hazard 37.49 37.50 15.56 4.83 100.00 0.00% 0.651 1008.64 *** -5.124 ***
72 rain 38.53 35.50 14.06 15.50 100.00 0.00% 0.787 1648.40 *** -3.989 ***
73 severe heat 26.85 26.83 16.85 0.00 91.67 7.79% 0.726 1497.97 *** -3.935 ***
74 severe weather 27.43 24.33 13.42 7.33 100.00 0.00% 0.465 547.87 *** -6.704 ***
75 severe weather risk 12.99 9.33 14.92 0.00 86.83 34.10% 0.490 743.06 *** -4.211 ***
76 snow 18.47 8.00 19.34 2.00 100.00 0.00% 0.846 1790.52 *** -8.864 ***
77 snow risk 11.85 7.33 13.23 0.00 100.00 13.03% 0.458 373.43 *** -6.639 ***
78 snow storm warning 5.71 1.00 11.75 0.00 100.00 45.08% 0.329 267.69 *** -8.331 ***
79 snow warning 6.73 3.17 10.45 0.00 100.00 7.92% 0.442 370.42 *** -9.642 ***
80 storm 15.64 11.83 13.35 3.00 100.00 0.00% 0.452 316.51 *** -10.540 ***
81 storm risk 15.3 12.33 12.13 0.00 100.00 2.81% 0.462 309.64 *** -9.107 ***
82 storm warning 20.78 16.50 14.88 0.00 100.00 0.13% 0.437 350.46 *** -9.977 ***
83 strong wind 32.8 32.17 12.89 0.00 100.00 0.38% 0.511 663.40 *** -6.287 ***
84 strong wind gust 11.27 3.67 14.21 0.00 78.17 49.04% 0.253 208.55 *** -9.757 ***
85 tornado 25.45 23.67 18.33 3.00 100.00 0.00% 0.806 1886.52 *** -3.760 ***
86 tornado risk 13.7 11.17 12.3 0.00 100.00 13.28% 0.470 578.05 *** -5.172 ***
87 tornado warning 14.11 8.67 15.51 0.17 100.00 0.00% 0.337 249.84 *** -7.392 ***
88 torrential rain 40.63 39.67 18.4 0.00 98.83 0.38% 0.881 2225.13 *** -2.373
89 tropical cyclone 9.37 7.17 8.47 1.17 100.00 0.00% 0.342 150.71 *** -11.703 ***
90 tropical cyclone risk 7.37 0.00 11.27 0.00 100.00 51.47% 0.313 185.98 *** -10.679 ***
91 tropical cyclone warning 11.52 9.50 11.98 0.00 100.00 19.92% 0.239 105.16 *** -9.888 ***
92 tropical storm 6.19 1.50 12.95 0.00 100.00 0.26% 0.412 215.04 *** -18.016 ***
93 tropical storm risk 12.51 8.50 13.46 0.00 100.00 9.20% 0.483 366.20 *** -8.709 ***
94 tropical storm warning 6.67 2.33 13.25 0.00 97.17 22.22% 0.272 152.35 *** -9.172 ***
95 tropical weather 11.01 5.17 14.78 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.594 573.30 *** -8.174 ***
96 typhoon 15.90 7.00 16.94 1.83 100.00 0.00% 0.834 1780.16 *** -2.749 *
97 typhoon risk 9.38 6.67 11.80 0.00 93.00 35.89% 0.387 236.54 *** -7.597 ***
98 typhoon warning 10.65 5.83 13.36 0.00 100.00 0.64% 0.410 206.83 *** -18.045 ***
99 weather blizzard warning 3.13 0.00 9.2 0.00 100.00 57.34% 0.196 40.50 *** -22.883 ***
100 weather risk 31.82 31.00 11.67 0.00 100.00 0.38% 0.431 441.82 *** -6.579 ***
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(cont.) Table A.1 Summary of Google search volume indices (GSVIs) 
 
 
Mean Median St.Dev Min Max % zeros AC1 LB4 ADF 
Weather (WE; 113 keywords)
101 weather warning 16.16 11.83 13.95 2.00 100.00 0.00% 0.445 428.58 *** -6.498 ***
102 wet weather 45.1 43.50 12.44 14.00 100.00 0.00% 0.425 362.59 *** -8.606 ***
103 wildfire 11.49 7.50 14.08 0.00 98.83 23.37% 0.531 508.92 *** -11.054 ***
104 wildfire risk 12.48 10.67 12.31 0.00 100.00 24.52% 0.269 163.11 *** -5.540 ***
105 wildfire warning 9.20 3.17 12.57 0.00 99.17 48.28% 0.296 145.76 *** -5.594 ***
106 wildfires 4.25 1.83 8.95 0.00 100.00 1.66% 0.391 161.57 *** -18.462 ***
107 wind 35.16 34.67 11.62 18.00 100.00 0.00% 0.557 674.54 *** -7.932 ***
108 wind gust 13.71 10.83 11.38 0.00 100.00 0.89% 0.474 515.69 *** -4.652 ***
109 wind gusts 9.75 5.67 11.71 0.00 100.00 4.73% 0.383 282.34 *** -7.437 ***
110 wind risk 28.83 28.00 17.04 0.00 96.17 7.41% 0.519 842.55 *** -3.451 ***
111 wind speed 23.31 23.67 9.95 9.00 100.00 0.00% 0.642 882.26 *** -5.758 ***
112 wind storm 20.67 18.00 11.29 2.50 100.00 0.00% 0.414 221.39 *** -17.966 ***
113 wind warning 15.19 11.83 12.96 0.00 100.00 6.00% 0.176 51.45 *** -23.312 ***
114 crop diseases 33.07 34.50 19.34 0.00 89.67 4.21% 0.659 1262.78 *** -3.407 **
115 crop pest 31.95 33.17 18.74 0.00 97.33 2.43% 0.715 1509.30 *** -2.954 **
116 crop pest risk 3.07 0.00 9.58 0.00 71.67 87.61% 0.140 35.56 *** -24.640 ***
117 crop pests 29.69 30.33 18.57 0.00 94.50 4.98% 0.684 1316.31 *** -4.570 ***
118 Ebola 15.36 7.33 18.17 0.00 100.00 21.20% 0.906 2198.67 *** -3.850 ***
119 insect pest 16.02 45.67 19.18 8.33 92.50 0.00% 0.842 2146.91 *** -3.299 **
120 La Roya 40.6 42.33 19.44 3.67 97.33 0.00% 0.808 1932.59 *** -2.827 *
121 pest control 67.23 67.67 15.31 30.00 99.67 0.00% 0.939 2478.16 *** -11.194 ***
122 pest risk 24.87 23.83 17.05 0.00 78.50 8.30% 0.548 890.41 *** -3.472 ***
123 rust coffee 15.77 15.33 11.69 0.00 100.00 15.07% 0.432 522.26 *** -5.238 ***
124 Africa instability 23.02 23.17 17.16 0.00 89.67 18.52% 0.437 536.22 *** -5.576 ***
125 Africa terrorism 24.92 22.50 12.91 0.00 100.00 0.89% 0.429 458.75 *** -5.704 ***
126 Libyan crisis 7.30 1.50 10.84 0.00 100.00 29.89% 0.564 744.77 *** -7.787 ***
127 Middle East conflict 16.26 14.33 11.03 0.00 100.00 0.13% 0.771 985.59 *** -10.017 ***
128 Middle East instability 12.28 8.67 13.81 0.00 74.50 36.65% 0.342 318.81 *** -6.707 ***
129 Middle East terrorism 21.81 19.33 12.87 0.00 100.00 0.77% 0.534 561.39 *** -8.882 ***
130 oil crisis 33.04 29.83 15.94 6.00 98.00 0.00% 0.848 1654.46 *** -7.968 ***
131 oil embargo 24.69 20.17 16.58 2.67 100.00 0.00% 0.831 1620.84 *** -6.496 ***
132 oil outage 10.53 8.00 12.15 0.00 100.00 33.72% 0.438 484.36 *** -3.076 **
133 Russian crisis 15.76 11.67 13.25 0.00 100.00 0.64% 0.762 1321.74 *** -5.398 ***
134 Syrian war 10.75 8.83 12.64 0.00 100.00 21.07% 0.633 770.79 *** -5.568 ***
135 terrorism 33.02 29.33 15.76 10.00 100.00 0.00% 0.870 1958.86 *** -4.457 ***
136 terrorist attack 6.54 4.50 9.16 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.289 81.65 *** -20.732 ***
137 terrorist attacks 11.82 8.83 10.84 2.00 100.00 0.00% 0.543 485.03 *** -7.016 ***
138 crisis 48.40 48.67 15.68 17.67 100.00 0.00% 0.944 2342.99 *** -4.732 ***
139 economic crisis 24.00 18.17 18.8 1.50 100.00 0.00% 0.959 2516.64 *** -4.084 ***
140 economic recession 26.65 20.17 19.55 0.00 100.00 0.26% 0.933 2419.65 *** -4.365 ***
141 financial crisis 24.51 25.33 18.45 1.00 100.00 0.00% 0.952 2497.79 *** -3.960 ***
142 recession 28.85 23.67 21.66 2.50 100.00 0.00% 0.944 2497.01 *** -2.491
143 recession 2008 27.64 22.17 23.72 0.00 98.83 19.03% 0.936 2482.11 *** -2.859 *
144 recession depression 23.67 13.67 23.1 0.00 100.00 2.17% 0.908 2263.30 *** -4.789 ***
145 the recession 32.10 27.50 24.63 1.67 100.00 0.00% 0.958 2583.74 *** -2.980 **
146 unemployment 41.28 39.17 11.2 23.17 100.00 0.00% 0.892 2111.31 *** -5.008 ***
147 unemployment rate 48.49 47.33 16.06 11.00 100.00 0.00% 0.826 1673.84 *** -4.472 ***
148 US recession 20.91 15.17 17.21 0.00 100.00 1.15% 0.890 2077.52 *** -2.090
149 US unemployment 42.47 41.50 16.1 8.33 100.00 0.00% 0.770 1482.37 *** -4.346 ***
Search keywords
Economic  (EC; 12 keywords)
Geopolitical  (GP; 14 keywords)
Agricult. diseases (DI; 10 keywords)
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Table A.2 Portfolios formed on second-end contracts and spreads  
The table summarizes the performance of long-short strategies based on second-end contracts 
(Panel A) and spreads (Panel B). Spreads are defined as the return difference between front-
end and second-end contracts. Newey-West robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses for the 
mean. CER denotes certainty equivalent return based on power utility. The time period covered 
by the portfolio returns is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
 
  
CFEAR Basis Momentum
Hedging 
pressure Convexity Skewness VaR1 VaR99
Basis 
momentum Liquidity
Panel A: Second-end contracts
Mean 0.0811 0.0599 0.0354 0.0522 0.0657 0.0469 -0.0257 0.0369 0.0429 -0.0124
(3.26) (2.54) (1.30) (2.22) (2.83) (1.91) (-0.94) (1.43) (1.84) (-0.47)
StDev 0.0939 0.0883 0.1086 0.0938 0.0830 0.0921 0.1057 0.1039 0.0858 0.0885
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0601 0.0573 0.0723 0.0591 0.0483 0.0525 0.0651 0.0631 0.0503 0.0570
Skewness -0.2125 -0.1262 -0.2511 -0.0395 0.0428 0.2002 0.0224 0.0843 0.1747 -0.1007
(-2.35) (-1.39) (-2.77) (-0.44) (0.47) (2.21) (0.25) (0.93) (1.93) (-1.11)
Excess Kurtosis 0.7562 0.7683 0.9687 1.1404 0.1804 0.4453 0.5506 0.4431 0.6882 0.9831
(4.17) (4.24) (5.35) (6.29) (1.00) (2.46) (3.04) (2.45) (3.80) (5.43)
JB normality test p -value 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.5000 0.0085 0.0141 0.0337 0.0015 0.0010
99% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0328 0.0306 0.0402 0.0331 0.0256 0.0281 0.0362 0.0334 0.0271 0.0325
% of positive months 56% 55% 53% 54% 56% 51% 49% 52% 51.6% 49%
Maximum drawdown -0.1890 -0.1538 -0.2101 -0.1816 -0.2261 -0.2434 -0.4943 -0.2724 -0.2383 -0.5490
Sharpe ratio 0.8633 0.6791 0.3257 0.5563 0.7918 0.5086 -0.2429 0.3551 0.4998 -0.1397
Sortino ratio 1.3481 1.0459 0.4894 0.8833 1.3612 0.8927 -0.3943 0.5846 0.8519 -0.2166
Omega ratio 1.3573 1.2757 1.1241 1.2209 1.3174 1.1975 0.9180 1.1356 1.1951 0.9513
CER (power utility) 0.0588 0.0403 0.0057 0.0301 0.0484 0.0257 -0.0537 0.0100 0.0245 -0.0320
Panel B: Spreads 
Mean 0.0145 -0.0277 -0.0182 0.0060 -0.0177 0.0036 0.0001 0.0036 0.0100 0.0076
(1.76) (-3.13) (-2.76) (1.01) (-2.14) (0.63) (0.01) (0.46) (1.23) (1.03)
StDev 0.0290 0.0334 0.0267 0.0215 0.0321 0.0239 0.0238 0.0269 0.0305 0.0284
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0200 0.0235 0.0189 0.0148 0.0225 0.0179 0.0173 0.0208 0.0214 0.0197
Skewness 0.3915 0.3383 -0.0457 0.0723 0.3018 0.2287 0.4533 -0.5295 -0.0119 0.1353
(4.32) (3.73) (-0.50) (0.80) (3.33) (2.52) (5.00) (-5.84) (-0.13) (1.49)
Excess Kurtosis 8.3974 6.0871 5.6028 2.6395 4.0826 15.1082 10.9424 6.9671 3.3884 6.8877
(46.34) (33.59) (30.92) (14.57) (22.53) (83.38) (60.39) (38.45) (18.70) (38.01)
JB normality test p -value 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
99% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0156 0.0166 0.0139 0.0085 0.0138 0.0187 0.0148 0.0158 0.0130 0.0149
% of positive months 51% 45% 44% 51% 47% 50% 51% 52% 52.4% 50%
Maximum drawdown -0.0686 -0.3228 -0.2262 -0.0848 -0.2586 -0.0907 -0.1153 -0.1194 -0.1044 -0.0621
Sharpe ratio 0.5011 -0.8285 -0.6831 0.2783 -0.5500 0.1490 0.0034 0.1328 0.3291 0.2675
Sortino ratio 0.7253 -1.1797 -0.9658 0.4038 -0.7850 0.1985 0.0047 0.1723 0.4698 0.3851
Omega ratio 1.2364 0.7159 0.7623 1.1152 0.8033 1.0656 1.0014 1.0547 1.1380 1.1144
CER (power utility) 0.0124 -0.0305 -0.0200 0.0048 -0.0203 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0018 0.0077 0.0056
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Table A.3 Relative importance of Google search keyword categories  
The table summarizes the performance of CFEAR portfolios based on all keywords (Weather, 
WE; Agricultural Diseases, DI; Geopolitical, GP; and Economic, EC) and subsets thereof. 
Newey-West robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses for the mean. CER denotes certainty 
equivalent return based on power utility. The time period covered by the portfolio returns is 
January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
 
 
All 
keywords
Without 
WE
Without 
DI 
Without 
GP
Without 
EC
Mean 0.0928 0.0475 0.0739 0.0948 0.0755
(3.35) (1.67) (2.96) (3.47) (2.92)
StDev 0.1030 0.1033 0.0991 0.1041 0.1022
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0649 0.0658 0.0627 0.0659 0.0641
Skewness -0.1307 -0.0350 -0.1013 -0.1776 -0.0717
(-1.44) (-0.39) (-1.12) (-1.96) (-0.79)
Excess Kurtosis 0.4012 0.8518 0.5859 0.4217 0.5648
(2.21) (4.70) (3.23) (2.33) (3.12)
JB normality test p -value 0.0320 0.0010 0.0068 0.0142 0.0101
99% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0341 0.0356 0.0334 0.0349 0.0341
% of positive months 57% 54% 56% 57% 56%
Maximum drawdown -0.1881 -0.1784 -0.1196 -0.1464 -0.1862
Sharpe ratio 0.9012 0.4601 0.7454 0.9108 0.7381
Sortino ratio 1.4299 0.7214 1.1790 1.4384 1.1783
Omega ratio 1.3770 1.1796 1.3058 1.3796 1.3019
CER (power utility) 0.0660 0.0208 0.0492 0.0674 0.0492
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Table A.4 CFEAR premium versus GPR and EPU uncertainty risks 
Panel A reports the risk exposures of the long-short CFEAR portfolio in the context of the 
Bakshi et al. (2019) three-factor model augmented with innovations in the geopolitical risk 
uncertainty (GPR) index of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) and the economic policy uncertainty 
(EPU) index of Baker et al. (2016). Newey-West robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
(Panel A). Panel B reports cross-sectional pricing tests for the same 56 commodity portfolios 
as in Table 5 of the manuscript. We report the (annualized) prices of risk with Shanken (1992) 
error-in-variables robust t-statistics in parentheses, and Kan et al. (2013) model 
misspecification and heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics in curly brackets. The observations 
for each variable cover the period from January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
Panel A: Time-series tests 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional tests 
  
Constant 0.0018 0.0018
(3.69) (3.69)
AVG -0.0110 -0.0113
(-0.32) (-0.33)
Basis -0.1729 -0.1732
(-2.89) (-2.89)
Momentum 0.2758 0.2756
(6.11) (6.11)
ΔGPR 0.0017
(0.23)
ΔEPU -0.0322
(-1.11)
Adj.-R² (%) 8.36 8.49
Constant -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0006
(-0.29) (-0.86) (-0.12) (-0.72)
{-0.29} {-0.93} {-0.12} {-0.79}
CFEAR 0.0947 0.0915
(2.81) (2.74)
{2.63} {2.70}
AVG -0.0200 0.0054 -0.0269 -0.0016
(-0.35) (0.10) (-0.46) (-0.03)
{-0.33} {0.10} {-0.46} {-0.03}
Basis 0.0511 0.0759 0.0552 0.0754
(1.59) (2.47) (1.68) (2.45)
{1.62} {2.65} {1.70} {2.63}
Momentum 0.0822 0.0419 0.0675 0.0393
(2.11) (1.17) (1.85) (1.15)
{2.07} {1.20} {1.70} {1.18}
ΔGPR 0.0160 0.0194
(1.25) (1.50)
{0.59} {1.01}
ΔEPU -0.0075 -0.0038
(-1.80) (-0.99)
{-1.26} {-0.81}
Adj.-R² (%) 34.47 65.51 39.43 64.20
MAPE (%) 0.048 0.038 0.048 0.038
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Table A.5 Cross-sectional pricing tests: 28 individual commodities 
The table reports the outcome of cross-sectional pricing tests using the 28 individual commodities as test assets. We report the (annualized) average 
prices of risk obtained in sequential (weekly) cross-sectional regressions on sequential betas with Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics in curly brackets 
and Shanken (1992) corrected t-statistics in parentheses. The observations cover the period is January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
 
Constant -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008
{-1.22} {0.13} {-0.17} {0.34} {0.03} {0.09} {-0.01} {0.69} {0.67} {-0.66} {-0.65} {-0.36} {-0.58} {-0.03} {-0.54} {-0.38} {-0.80} {-0.55} {-0.85}
(-1.20) (0.12) (-0.15) (0.32) (0.03) (0.09) (-0.01) (0.64) (0.61) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-0.35) (-0.54) (-0.03) (-0.51) (-0.37) (-0.74) (-0.51) (-0.78)
CFEAR 0.0644 0.0755 0.0801 0.0742 0.0767 0.0878 0.0779 0.0711 0.0844 0.0768
{2.17} {2.54} {2.73} {2.47} {2.60} {3.00} {2.66} {2.35} {2.84} {2.49}
(2.12) (2.36) (2.52) (2.30) (2.35) (2.79) (2.51) (2.21) (2.65) (2.28)
AVG -0.0500 -0.0402 -0.0578 -0.0477 -0.0500 -0.0466 -0.0729 -0.0739 -0.0171 -0.0183 -0.0311 -0.0222 -0.0433 -0.0231 -0.0296 -0.0144 -0.0004 -0.0051
{-1.09} {-0.87} {-1.23} {-1.01} {-1.07} {-1.01} {-1.56} {-1.57} {-0.35} {-0.38} {-0.63} {-0.45} {-0.90} {-0.49} {-0.65} {-0.31} {-0.34} {-0.09}
(-1.04) (-0.81) (-1.17) (-0.93) (-1.03) (-0.94) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-0.87) (-0.46) (-0.64) (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.09)
Basis 0.0256 0.0507 0.0020 0.0294 0.0213 0.0454 0.0014 0.0185 0.0075 0.0455 0.0093 0.0383 0.0065 0.0401 0.0335 0.0465 0.0004 0.0242
{0.68} {1.39} {0.05} {0.78} {0.56} {1.21} {0.04} {0.50} {0.20} {1.22} {0.25} {1.04} {0.17} {1.05} {0.89} {1.24} {0.49} {0.54}
(0.65) (1.28) (0.05) (0.72) (0.54) (1.13) (0.04) (0.45) (0.20) (1.14) (0.25) (0.98) (0.16) (0.99) (0.86) (1.16) (0.45) (0.49)
Momentum 0.0691 0.0604 0.0347 0.0164 0.0607 0.0508 0.0197 0.0036 0.0544 0.0397 0.0524 0.0470 0.0570 0.0382 0.0488 0.0414 0.0002 -0.0050
{1.86} {1.58} {0.94} {0.43} {1.57} {1.31} {0.53} {0.10} {1.43} {1.04} {1.40} {1.24} {1.47} {0.98} {1.27} {1.06} {0.27} {-0.11}
(1.77) (1.46) (0.90) (0.40) (1.52) (1.22) (0.49) (0.09) (1.39) (0.97) (1.36) (1.17) (1.42) (0.92) (1.24) (0.99) (0.25) (-0.10)
Hedging pressure 0.0587 0.0540 0.0011 0.0509
{2.00} {1.83} {1.83} {1.68}
(1.90) (1.68) (1.70) (1.54)
Convexity -0.0076 -0.0120 0.0005 0.0547
{-0.15} {-0.24} {0.47} {0.96}
(-0.15) (-0.22) (0.43) (0.88)
Skewness 0.0846 0.0780 0.0012 0.0611
{2.50} {2.29} {1.70} {1.57}
(2.30) (2.07) (1.58) (1.44)
VaR1 -0.0423 -0.0265 -0.0008 -0.0314
{-1.29} {-0.83} {-1.20} {-0.89}
(-1.26) (-0.77) (-1.12) (-0.82)
VaR99 0.0438 0.0376 0.0002 0.0148
{1.31} {1.14} {0.33} {0.41}
(1.27) (1.07) (0.31) (0.38)
Basis-momentum 0.0419 0.0539 0.0011 0.0545
{1.28} {1.62} {1.49} {1.48}
(1.23) (1.52) (1.39) (1.36)
Liquidity -0.0240 -0.0088 0.0000 -0.0021
{-0.81} {-0.30} {-0.05} {-0.07}
(-0.79) (-0.28) (-0.05) (-0.06)
Adj.-R² (%) 6.95 14.93 19.76 19.25 23.35 18.37 22.79 18.90 22.83 19.60 23.07 19.47 22.65 18.64 23.25 18.40 22.81 36.25 38.55
MAPE (%) 2.543 2.322 2.193 2.208 2.092 2.225 2.101 2.212 2.093 2.201 2.097 2.199 2.101 2.221 2.099 2.221 2.099 1.656 1.569
Base model augmented with All risk factorsCFEAR Base model
Fundamental risk factors Tail risk factors Liquidity and volatility risk factors
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Table A.6 Summary of commodity-specific media coverage (news) variables 
The table summarizes the distribution of the total number of news articles published each week on each commodity with relevance score 25 (news 
mildly related to the commodity) and relevance score 75 (strongly related). AC1 is the first-order autocorrelation. LB4 is the Ljung-Box test statistic 
(H0: first four autocorrelations are jointly zero) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic (H0: unit root non-stationarity). *. ** and *** are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The observation period is January 2004(week1) – December 2018(week4). 
 
   
 
Mean Median StDev Min Max AC1 LB4 ADF Mean Median StDev Min Max AC1 LB4 ADF
I. Agricultural sector (N=17)
Corn 2970.7 2977.0 492.8 152.0 5331.0 0.649 892 *** -6.71 *** 888.1 938.0 276.3 0.0 1678 0.828 1879 *** -3.69 ***
Oats 928.4 912.0 223.6 105.0 1609.0 0.786 1636 *** -4.46 *** 126.7 103.0 88.2 0.0 468 0.918 2403 *** -3.77 ***
Rough rice 1264.4 1212.0 361.7 47.0 2289.0 0.604 977 *** -6.08 *** 188.6 184.0 71.0 7.0 608 0.822 1608 *** -6.99 ***
Wheat CBT 2832.6 2951.0 518.7 159.0 4904.0 0.712 1188 *** -5.63 *** 1147.1 1182.0 308.6 15.0 1906 0.795 1634 *** -4.38 ***
Cotton no.2 735.8 769.0 265.4 123.0 2193.0 0.728 1476 *** -3.53 *** 279.6 277.0 104.7 17.0 1513 0.663 1255 *** -1.82
Soybeans 2170.7 2663.0 502.2 145.0 4593.0 0.719 1324 *** -5.42 *** 697.3 702.0 174.5 4.0 1204 0.753 1365 *** -5.31 ***
Soybean meal 1190.3 1123.0 294.9 0.0 2500.0 0.862 2023 *** -3.87 *** 293.8 291.0 79.7 0.0 1178 0.660 944.5 *** -6.67 ***
Soybean oil 1507.0 1489.0 260.0 116.0 2327.0 0.735 1240 *** -5.86 *** 381.5 381.0 127.4 6.0 759 0.844 1904 *** -4.19 ***
Feeder cattle 577.4 520.0 236.5 0.0 1135.0 0.895 2373 *** -2.51 127.4 125.0 33.2 0.0 325 0.466 267.1 *** -16.93 ***
Lean hogs 526.3 458.0 211.8 108.0 1209.0 0.907 2337 *** -3.05 ** 260.2 233.0 94.1 0.0 706 0.835 1933 *** -3.20 **
Live cattle 543.7 519.0 239.0 36.0 1224.0 0.912 2476 *** -2.65 * 97.5 78.0 57.6 0.0 614 0.742 1422 *** -5.03 ***
Frozen pork bellies 192.4 76.0 217.2 0.0 1282.0 0.959 2764 *** -2.53 45.8 4.0 74.2 0.0 667 0.849 2085 *** -2.88 **
Cocoa 562.6 550.0 194.1 155.0 1407.0 0.754 1455 *** -4.88 *** 255.2 258.0 107.0 24.0 763 0.888 2295 *** -2.50
Coffee C 668.5 704.0 241.4 133.0 1522.0 0.750 1554 *** -3.18 ** 332.9 338.0 144.7 32.0 873 0.900 2366 *** -1.66
Frozen Orange juice 87.2 86.0 51.8 9.0 417.0 0.799 1856 *** -3.27 ** 23.8 19.0 17.1 0.0 233 0.494 674.4 *** -4.22 ***
Sugar no.11 725.1 731.0 279.9 108.0 1461.0 0.820 1928 *** -2.76 * 331.4 343.0 149.8 26.0 658 0.902 2387 *** -2.72 *
Lumber 408.6 310.0 271.0 5.0 1009.0 0.954 2790 *** -1.91 81.1 70.0 41.6 0.0 374 0.828 1675 *** -6.66 ***
II. Energy sector (N=6)
Light crude oil 8064.9 7789.0 2604.7 2928.0 20459.0 0.825 1607 *** -5.28 *** 3633.5 3466.0 1257.8 1460.0 9319 0.817 1678 *** -4.69 ***
Electricity JPM 470.8 434.0 316.9 12.0 1534.0 0.839 2140 *** -0.41 108.9 96.0 86.6 1.0 451 0.916 2483 *** -1.42
Gasoline RBOB 2225.9 2080.0 608.1 469.0 5371.0 0.841 1944 *** -3.46 *** 783.4 767.0 254.7 152.0 1773 0.819 1836 *** -3.88 ***
Heating oil 711.6 694.0 361.9 15.0 2020.0 0.934 2511 *** -0.64 161.4 158.0 147.8 6.0 688 0.919 2565 *** -2.20
Natural gas 3049.5 3050.0 921.8 835.0 5740.0 0.835 1584 *** -0.95 1115.2 1113.0 427.0 321.0 3187 0.815 1514 *** -1.15
NY unleaded gas 2225.9 2080.0 608.1 469.0 5371.0 0.841 1944 *** -3.46 *** 783.4 767.0 254.7 152.0 1773 0.819 1836 *** -3.88 ***
III. Metals (N=5)
Copper (High Grade) 1857.5 1733.0 665.1 422.0 3889.0 0.889 2267 *** -2.78 * 516.9 502.0 226.1 51.0 1310 0.849 1994 *** -1.48
Gold 100oz (CMX) 2727.3 2514.0 911.6 741.0 6041.0 0.869 2117 *** -2.91 ** 1035.6 985.0 386.8 265.0 2713 0.820 1813 *** -3.33 **
Palladium 456.8 426.0 218.7 105.0 1058.0 0.911 2444 *** -2.24 161.2 197.0 156.8 25.0 991 0.706 2196 *** -4.29 ***
Platinum 836.4 831.0 440.1 148.0 2134.0 0.951 2720 *** -1.04 261.2 197.0 156.8 25.0 991 0.866 2196 *** -2.87 **
Silver 5000 oz 1164.2 1115.0 338.4 256.0 2722.0 0.865 2040 *** -2.23 323.4 307.0 134.3 93.0 1072 0.804 1730 *** -3.58 ***
Commodity 
News with relevance score 25/100 News relevance score 75/100
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Table A.7 Coefficient estimates of predictability regressions à la Vozlyublennaia (2014)  
This table reports the OLS estimation results of return predictability regressions A, = A + ∑ HAG ∙ A,GG4* + ∑ IAG ∙ ∆GG4* + ∑  AG ∙ A,* ∙ ∆GG4* + KA, per 
commodity (i = 1,…,28). G is the lagged aggregated change in searches by 149 hazards as query terms,  = ∑ ∆%,∗*%4*  where  ∆%,∗ = D,R,R∆ =
 (,R/,RS/)
,R∆
  is the standardized “attention” variable associated with the jth hazard. The absolute value of the coefficient of lagged return 
|HAG| captures the degree of predictability when there is no attention, and |HAG +  AG| with  AG the coefficient of the interaction variable captures the 
degree of predictability when there is attention. The estimation window is January 2004 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). Newey-West robust 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significant slopes are highlighted in bold. 
 
I. Agricultural sector (N=17) II. Energy sector (N=6)
Corn -0.0032 0.0380 0.0183 0.0423 0.0004 0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 Light crude oil 0.0022 0.0506 0.0488 0.0152 0.0020 0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0018
(-0.07) (1.02) (0.46) (1.05) (0.22) (1.07) (1.04) (0.69) (0.05) (1.27) (0.94) (0.38) (1.40) (0.93) (-0.54) (-0.87)
Oats -0.0294 0.0002 0.0423 -0.0756 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0007 Electricity JPM 0.0201 0.0301 0.0157 0.1024 0.0011 -0.0038 0.0011 -0.0002
(-0.91) (0.01) (1.09) (-1.92) (0.39) (0.45) (-0.68) (0.62) (0.47) (0.71) (0.38) (2.13) (0.62) (-2.84) (0.55) (-0.14)
Rough rice -0.0013 -0.0337 -0.0482 -0.0210 -0.0019 0.0024 0.0000 -0.0001 Gasoline RBOB 0.0488 0.0351 0.1238 -0.0109 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0023 -0.0024
(-0.03) (-0.84) (-1.30) (-0.54) (-1.71) (2.04) (0.03) (-0.05) (1.03) (0.75) (2.08) (-0.22) (2.04) (1.07) (-1.49) (-1.24)
Wheat CBT 0.0162 -0.0186 0.0045 -0.0021 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0020 0.0004 Heating oil 0.0270 0.0003 0.0221 0.0368 0.0000 0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0016
(0.41) (-0.50) (0.12) (-0.06) (-0.17) (0.54) (1.70) (0.29) (0.59) (0.01) (0.47) (0.97) (0.01) (0.71) (-0.98) (-0.90)
Cotton no.2 0.0195 -0.0120 -0.0285 -0.0291 0.0011 0.0025 0.0015 -0.0032 Natural gas -0.0301 0.0645 -0.0182 -0.0065 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0012
(0.50) (-0.28) (-0.67) (-0.75) (0.87) (1.84) (0.81) (-2.21) (-0.79) (1.69) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.31) (1.02) (0.81)
Soybeans 0.0280 -0.0074 0.0135 -0.0146 -0.0008 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0009 NY unleaded gas -0.0301 0.1025 0.0441 -0.0668 0.0043 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0028
(0.74) (-0.18) (0.37) (-0.31) (-0.32) (0.34) (-0.74) (0.52) (-0.41) (1.24) (0.53) (-0.89) (2.14) (-0.01) (-0.28) (1.56)
Soybean meal 0.0454 -0.0011 0.0139 -0.0355 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0023
(1.13) (-0.03) (0.40) (-0.75) (-0.33) (-0.16) (-0.31) (1.30)
Soybean oil -0.0153 -0.0289 0.0348 -0.0161 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0016 III. Metals (N=5)
(-0.39) (-0.76) (0.66) (-0.31) (-0.31) (0.17) (-1.31) (-1.09) Copper (High Grade) 0.0136 0.0838 0.0324 0.0493 -0.0001 0.0017 -0.0004 0.0003
Feeder cattle -0.0459 -0.0166 0.0603 0.0225 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0020 (0.28) (1.93) (0.73) (1.21) (-0.09) (0.76) (-0.26) (0.17)
(-1.21) (-0.45) (1.56) (0.46) (-0.90) (0.25) (1.61) (-1.39) Gold 100oz (CMX) -0.0118 -0.0134 -0.0571 0.0146 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0015 0.0006
Lean hogs 0.0772 0.1037 -0.0290 -0.0642 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0023 (-0.30) (-0.35) (-1.93) (0.32) (0.40) (1.30) (-1.06) (0.48)
(1.60) (2.26) (-0.54) (-1.59) (1.16) (2.01) (-1.55) (-1.31) Palladium 0.0201 -0.0008 -0.0082 -0.0152 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0015
Live cattle -0.0663 -0.1561 0.0386 0.0251 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0009 -0.0014 (0.47) (-0.02) (-0.15) (-0.40) (-1.02) (0.08) (-1.29) (-1.10)
(-1.94) (-4.79) (0.91) (0.55) (-0.97) (0.13) (0.59) (-1.04) Platinum 0.0145 0.0601 0.0327 -0.0228 0.0006 0.0022 -0.0007 0.0029
Frozen pork bellies -0.0485 0.0511 -0.1071 0.0347 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0019 (0.44) (1.28) (0.54) (-0.48) (0.40) (1.61) (-0.42) (1.63)
(-0.85) (0.90) (-1.52) (0.68) (0.01) (-0.44) (-0.26) (0.88) Silver 5000 oz 0.0162 -0.0182 -0.0335 0.0373 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0035 0.0009
Cocoa -0.0141 -0.0573 -0.0382 -0.0546 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0000 (0.37) (-0.49) (-0.92) (0.93) (-0.21) (0.55) (-2.07) (0.76)
(-0.38) (-1.35) (-0.96) (-1.40) (1.04) (0.75) (-1.35) (-0.01)
Coffee C 0.0092 -0.0247 -0.0365 -0.0477 0.0006 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0027
(0.21) (-0.61) (-0.90) (-1.36) (0.38) (0.14) (0.71) (-1.57)
Frozen Orange juice 0.0363 -0.0304 -0.1007 -0.0128 -0.0012 0.0007 0.0001 0.0016
(0.95) (-0.83) (-2.86) (-0.33) (-0.86) (0.50) (0.07) (0.95)
Sugar no.11 -0.0336 0.0228 0.1010 -0.0129 -0.0011 0.0002 0.0005 0.0011
(-0.82) (0.58) (2.58) (-0.36) (-0.78) (0.10) (0.42) (0.80)
Lumber 0.0198 0.0251 -0.0396 -0.0440 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0002
(0.54) (0.61) (-1.03) (-1.09) (1.23) (-0.10) (-0.38) (0.13)
HA,* HA,+ HA, HA,  A ,*  A ,+  A ,  A , HA,* HA,+ HA, HA,  A ,*  A ,+  A ,  A ,
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Table A.8 Robustness tests: Alternative CFEAR portfolio construction methods 
The table summarizes the CFEAR factor obtained through alternative long-short portfolio 
construction methods where: (1) the lookback period is a fixed-length rolling window of 10 
years (E = 520 weeks); (2) the long Q1 and short Q5 quintile constituents are weighted by 
the strength of the standardized signals; (3)-(6) the long Q1 and short Q5 portfolios include 
N/2 commodities each which are weighted equally, by standardized rankings, by standardized 
signals, and by winsorized and standardized signals; (7) at each portfolio formation time we 
consider only the 0.8N of the commodities with the largest open interest on the prior week. 
The portfolio returns are from January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 5), except in 
column (1) which are from January 2014 (week 1). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean 0.0740 0.0827 0.0495 0.0621 0.0593 0.0607 0.1014
(1.66) (2.64) (3.08) (3.12) (2.40) (2.50) (3.47)
StDev 0.0980 0.1156 0.0601 0.0760 0.0943 0.0928 0.1114
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0575 0.0721 0.0368 0.0475 0.0595 0.0587 0.0672
Skewness 0.1889 -0.0474 -0.0591 -0.1231 -0.0839 -0.0863 -0.0217
Excess Kurtosis 0.4577 0.7776 0.3853 0.4418 0.8139 0.7258 0.3881
JB normality test p -value 0.1151 0.0013 0.0776 0.0234 0.0010 0.0019 0.0894
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0296 0.0392 0.0196 0.0253 0.0325 0.0317 0.0356
% of positive months 54% 54% 56% 57% 54% 54% 56%
Maximum drawdown -0.1071 -0.1696 -0.0837 -0.1131 -0.1343 -0.1331 -0.1731
Sharpe ratio 0.7545 0.7151 0.8234 0.8176 0.6293 0.6539 0.9101
Sortino ratio 1.2856 1.1462 1.3460 1.3074 0.9968 1.0334 1.5093
Omega ratio 1.3186 1.2921 1.3372 1.3350 1.2531 1.2637 1.3801
CER (power utility) 0.0500 0.0491 0.0404 0.0476 0.0370 0.0391 0.0702
Equal 
weights
Standardized 
rankings
Standardized 
signals
Quintiles, 
Rolling 
windows (L=10 
years)
Quintiles, 
Standardized 
signals
Whole cross-section
Winsorized 
standardized 
signals
80% most 
liquid comm
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Table A.9 Long-short portfolios with monthly rebalancing 
The table reports the performance of the CFEAR portfolio, alongside the set of alternative portfolios summarized in Appendix A deployed with 
end-of-month sorting and a one-month holding period. Newey-West robust h.a.c. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. CER is the certainty 
equivalent return based on power utility. The return observations cover the time period January 2005 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4). 
 
 
 
CFEAR AVG Basis Momentum
Hedging 
pressure Convexity Skewness VaR1 VaR99
Basis-
Momentum Liquidity
Mean 0.0798 -0.0330 0.0516 0.0068 0.0516 0.0635 0.0457 -0.0174 0.0443 0.0411 0.0072
(3.06) (-0.72) (1.62) (0.24) (1.99) (2.33) (1.97) (-0.59) (1.47) (1.36) (0.24)
StDev 0.1010 0.1471 0.1030 0.1108 0.0923 0.1066 0.0961 0.1141 0.1082 0.1023 0.1012
Downside volatility (0%) 0.0544 0.1170 0.0587 0.0677 0.0516 0.0561 0.0550 0.0758 0.0677 0.0712 0.0742
Skewness 0.0155 -0.8037 0.3772 0.2467 0.1402 0.4405 0.1845 -0.1963 -0.1796 -0.4079 -0.4276
(0.08) (-4.25) (2.00) (1.31) (0.74) (2.33) (0.98) (-1.04) (-0.95) (-2.16) (-2.26)
Excess Kurtosis 0.2009 3.1259 1.5263 0.7557 0.3367 1.8552 0.2993 0.4661 0.4298 1.3369 1.4942
(0.53) (8.27) (4.04) (2.00) (0.89) (4.91) (0.79) (1.23) (1.14) (3.54) (3.95)
JB normality test p -value 0.5000 0.0010 0.0027 0.0488 0.4535 0.0010 0.3922 0.2117 0.2733 0.0042 0.0025
1% VaR (Cornish-Fisher) 0.0622 0.1474 0.0656 0.0729 0.0568 0.0674 0.0585 0.0859 0.0759 0.0815 0.0848
% of positive months 61% 50% 55% 50% 55% 55% 54% 46% 58% 58% 55%
Maximum drawdown -0.1664 -0.5394 -0.1977 -0.2533 -0.2070 -0.1793 -0.1975 -0.4145 -0.2511 -0.2600 -0.4237
Sharpe ratio 0.7906 -0.2244 0.5015 0.0618 0.5592 0.5956 0.4753 -0.1530 0.4089 0.4018 0.0714
Sortino ratio 1.4673 -0.2822 0.8797 0.1011 0.9996 1.1328 0.8299 -0.2303 0.6534 0.5777 0.0974
Omega ratio 1.7623 0.8357 1.4558 1.0480 1.5001 1.5744 1.4238 0.8941 1.3480 1.3517 1.0567
CER (power utility) 0.0540 -0.0943 0.0257 -0.0235 0.0304 0.0356 0.0229 -0.0510 0.0147 0.0143 -0.0191
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Table A.10 Cross-sections of financial futures contracts 
The table details the futures contracts employed in the placebo tests of Section 5.4 of the 
paper. The observation period is January 2004 (week 1) to December 2018 (week 4).  
 
 
Panel A: Equity index futures  (N=40)
Panel B: Fixed Income and interest 
rates futures (N=13)
Panel C: Currency futures  
(N=19)
Dow-Jones Industrial Average 1-Month Eurodollar Australian Dollar 
E-mini Dow-Jones Industrial Average 30-Day FED Funds Brazilian Real 
E-mini MSCI EAFE 3-Month Eurodollar Canadian Dollar 
E-mini MSCI Emerging Markets 2-Year U.S. Treasury Note Chinese Renmimbi
E-mini Russell 2000 3-Year U.S. Treasury Note Czech Koruna
E-Mini S&P500 5-Year Eurodollar Bundle Euro 
Euro Stoxx 50 5-Year U.S. Treasury Note Hungarian Forint
MSCI Asia 10-Year U.S. Treasury Note Israeli Shekel
MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America 30-Year U.S. Treasury Bond Japanese Yen 
MSCI India Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Korean Won
MSCI Russia Municipal Bond Index Mexican Peso 
MSCI Taiwan Ultra 10-Year U.S. Treasury Note New Zealand Dollar 
MSCI Thailand Ultra Treasury Bond Index Norwegian Krona
MSCI USA Polish Zloty
MSCI World Russian Rouble 
Nasdaq 100 South African Rand 
Nasdaq Biotechnology Sterling 
Nikkei 225 Swedish Krona
NYSE composite Swiss Franc 
Russell 1000
Russell 1000 Growth
Russell 1000 Value
Russell 2000 Growth
Russell 2000 Value
Russell 3000
S&P Citigroup Growth
S&P Citigroup Value
S&P Consumer Discretionary
S&P Consumer Staples
S&P Energy
S&P Finance
S&P Health
S&P Industrial 
S&P Information Technology
S&P Materials
S&P Small Capitalization
S&P Utilities
S&P400 Mid Capitalization 
S&P500 
Value Line
